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PREFACE

A word to the non-philosophers reading this dissertation:

“ … one need not be a philosopher to read philosophy. Not only is philosophy open to two
readings, philosophy needs two readings at the same time. A non-philosophical reading of
philosophy is absolutely necessary, without which there would be no beauty in philosophy.”

~Gilles Deleuze

Source: Boutang, Pierre-Andre, director. Gilles Deleuze from A to Z. Performance by Gilles
Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Semiotext(e), 2011.
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ABSTRACT

Author: Albrecht, Ashley, A. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: Turning a Multivalent Lens toward Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Film
Major Professor: Daniel W. Smith

With innovations in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) advancing at an exponential rate,
it is ever the more pertinent to interrogate the ramifications and potentialities of these
developments. Luciano Floridi, known as “the Google philosopher,” considers this phenomenon
an integral part of the digital information age or the “Fourth Revolution.” We are now forced to
confront the following problems: What is the relationship between humans and AI? What does it
mean to be “human”? What futures are possible given our current coevolution with AI? Such
questions motivate close philosophical consideration. Here, the theoretical polarization of the
doomsday neo-Luddite versus the overzealous futurist unnecessarily constrains philosophical
dialogue.
Employing a feminist methodological approach, I turn to two films, Jonze’s Her &
Garland’s Ex Machina, to explore these questions. The conditions of possibility that allowed for
these films to emerge, point toward a simultaneous critique of phallogocentrism and
anthropocentrism. Several frameworks - primarily feminist, psychoanalytic, Deleuzoguattarian,
& Heideggerian - are deployed in this dissertation. Using visual media as the lens through which
to probe these issues, I investigate how technology (AI specifically) changes what we consider to
be human, our affective relation to technology, and how we coevolve with technology.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) &
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate how technology (AI,
specifically) changes what we consider to be the human, our affective relation to technology, and
how we co-evolve with technology. The myriad substantiations of AI are broad: “While science
fiction often portrays AI as robots with human-like characteristics, AI can encompass anything
from Google’s search algorithms to IBM’s Watson to autonomous weapons” (Future of Life
Institute). Although perhaps not readily apparent, the relationship between AI theory & research
and the field of philosophy is long established.
The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is conceived of as “interdisciplinary” in nature,
including computer science, psychology, engineering, philosophy, and beyond. In a survey of AI
researchers, when asked which academic discipline the field of AI research is most closely tied
to, the majority answered “philosophy” (Brighton & Selina 17).
In 1956, at a conference hosted by Dartmouth College, the American computer scientist
John McCarthy coined the term, defining AI as “the construction of intelligent machinery”
(Brighton & Selina 3). In a little over 60 years, innovations in AI have developed at an
increasingly exponential rate, and the field now informs the majority of techno-militaryindustrial research within the developed world.
While AI research has been historically interdisciplinary, the research trajectories of each
sub-discipline have become increasingly fragmented. As computer scientists Antonio Lieto and
Marco Cruciani explain: “This fragmentation … has been based on a divide et impera approach
that has significantly inhibited the cross-field collaborations and the scientific efforts aimed at
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investigating a more general picture of what natural and artificial intelligence are, and how
intelligent artifacts can be designed by taking into account the insights coming from the natural
world” (103). As of 2017, very few universities maintain academic departments dedicated to an
interdisciplinary exploration of AI research. New York University (NYU) is one of those few.
The mission of NYU’s AI Now Institute is to inquire into the social implications of AI from the
perspective of the humanities and social sciences. The Stanford media theorist Fred Turner, for
instance, is on the institute’s academic council. However, social scientists dominate the list of
researchers, which seems incomplete without a counterbalance of arts & humanities scholars.
The founders identified a paucity of “agreed-upon methods to measure and assess the social
implications of AI, even as these systems are being rapidly integrated into core social institutions”
(AI Now Institute). The rapid acceleration and proliferation of AI research and development boils
down to three main factors, as identified in the AI Now 2017 Report: “better algorithms, increases
in networked computer power and the tech industry’s ability to capture and store massive amounts
of data” (Campolo et al. 2). “Better” (more complex), “power” (productivity) and “massive”
(memory capacity) are the operative words here - qualities that have taken on an almost divine
quality in contemporary society. We worship them as much in machines, as we do in ourselves.
The self-help industry took advantage of these constructed deficits right away. If one adopts the
logic of the tech industry, there exists no reason why one wouldn’t want to be more “intelligent”
(narrowly defined, mainly via standardized IQ), or “productive” (labor power), or “cognitively
enhanced” (increased capacity for memory - and thus, information).
AI and related algorithmic systems have already been adopted by numerous corporations
to monitor/track/measure the productivity of their workers. The company Veriato, for example,
develops employee monitoring software that “offers features to score email and chats for sentiment
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using natural language processing. Language that their program determines to be ‘negative’ is
interpreted by the company as an indication of a productivity risk, or of an employee who is getting
ready to leave the company” (Campolo et al. 11). The linkage between such non-transparent
workplace surveillance and the increasing automation of human labor is clear. “As consumers
grow accustomed to dealing with automated systems, there is a potential to ignore or devalue the
human labor that remains essential in many instances. The AI Now 2016 Labor Primer emphasized
that AI often demands ‘human caretakers’ — these vary, from workers who maintain and repair
data centers to moderators who check the results of even the most sophisticated computer vision
algorithms. (Campolo et al.12). While the AI Now Institute focuses more on the socioeconomic
impact of increasing automation coupled with decreased valuation of human labor, a humanities
perspective may look into differently-posed questions - such as, “What does it mean to be human?”
It is incumbent upon AI researchers to adopt a more holistic methodology to AI research.
One of the fields that is critical to the development of such a holistic perspective is philosophy.
As mentioned above, philosophy is already deeply entrenched in questions directly related to AI
research, such as the “hard problem of consciousness,” the mind-body problem, and
technoethics, to name a few. The connections traverse the spectrum, from AI-easy to AI-hard or
complete.
Introducing Gendered Representations of AI in Film
The contemporary science fiction films Her (Jonze, 2013) and Ex Machina (Garland,
2015) both contain tragic romance narratives that revolve around the relationship between a man
(who conforms to American mythical norm of white, average-sized, & middle-class) and a
"female" form of artificial intelligence (AI). In Her, the AI is a non-embodied operating system
(OS) named Samantha (narrated by the popular American actress Scarlett Johansson), purchased
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by the melancholic, recently-separated, greeting card letter-writer Theodore. In Ex Machina, the
AI presents as an intelligent humanoid robot or android (named Ava) that anatomically replicates
a human female, designed by search engine company CEO and genius programmer, Nathan, in a
remotely-located research facility.
Out of a competitive pool of programmers, Nathan selects Caleb - a nerdy, 20-something
single man - to stay at his research facility for a week and perform a Turing test of sorts on Ava.
I will go into greater detail on the Turing test in my brief discussion of the history and theory of
AI below.
History of AI
Although there exist myriad philosophers and writers who have alluded to forms (such as
found in Greco-Roman mythology or Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein) that could be considered
precursors to AI, our contemporary understanding of AI has its origins in the theoretical models
of computing proposed by English mathematician Alan Turing. The concept of AI was most
succinctly presented in his 1950 essay, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (Turing).
Grappling with the question of "Can a machine think?", Turing proposed an imitation game to
test if the activity of an AI can be considered "thinking." This game (later dubbed the Turing
test), in its original form, involves three parties: “On one side of a computer screen sits a human
judge, whose job is to chat to some mysterious interlocutors on the other side. Most of those
interlocutors will be humans; one will be a chatbot, created for the sole purpose of tricking the
judge into thinking that it is the real human” (Hern). Thinking is thus defined in narrow, humanderived terms, based on the assumption of a clear subject/object division. Multiple philosophers
have responded to Turing’s theories of AI; most famously, John Searle in his Chinese room
argument - “a thought experiment [posted] to challenge strong artificial intelligence” (Hayles
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97). The focus of Turing’s test, however, evades what philosophers call the "hard problem of
consciousness" - in short, the question of how consciousness emerges via the body.
Turing, along with multiple other computer scientists from universities across the U.S.,
converged at Dartmouth College in 1956 for the first official academic conference on the
burgeoning computer science field of AI (Moor 87). By the 1960s, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) actively funded research and development into AI. An off-shoot of the DoD, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) devoted itself to AI research, and
continues to devote much of its energies to it today. For example, DARPA's current Explainable
AI (XAI) program seeks to make new machine-learning techniques that will provide humans
with more intuitive explanations of the outputs of AI algorithms (Gunning). As soon as AI had
been academically established within the field of computer science, it was co-opted by the
techno-military-industrial-complex (TMIC).
Half a century later, both fledgling startups and established corporations are investing in
AI for civilian use. As DARPA continued to weaponize AI, Apple created
"Siri," IBM developed "Watson," and Amazon invented "Alexa." While Siri and Alexa are both
intelligent personal assistants with feminine voices, Watson (named after IBM’s first CEO) is
decidedly masculine and was originally developed as a question answering (QA) system, that
eventually went on to compete with humans on the quiz show Jeopardy! Further discussion of
gendered personal digital assistants will appear in Chapter V.
Female Representations of AI in Film
To return to the films introduced at the beginning: Her and Ex Machina both revolve
around the relationship between a single man (Theodore; Caleb) and an AI (Samantha; Ava) that
exhibits high femininity (think Traditional Masculinity-Femininity Scale, Kachel et al. 2016).
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While Samantha and Ava are markedly different forms of AI (Samantha is marketed by an
Apple-like company as an intelligent personal assistant & Ava is an android still in the stages of
research and development and lacking a given ‘purpose’), they are both gendered in predictable
ways.
While literature on the films refers to Samantha and Ava as androids, perhaps a more
appropriate descriptor for the two is the female variant “gynoid.” A term coined by British
science fiction writer Gwyneth Jones (in her 1984 novel Divine Endurance), gynoid "probably
alludes to the rise of gynocriticism and/or ‘gynesis,’ discourses developed by Elaine Showalter
and Alice Jardine to promote the rewriting of male-dominated history” (Tatsumi 97). In a talk
given on her novel, Jones describes the gynoid Cho (Chosen Among the Beautiful) as “designed
to serve and give pleasure as the lifelong companion of a single human owner” (3). Divine
Endurance merges a critique of technology with that of female desire. Speaking on
technological objects/tools, Jones states: “Meetings with fascinating artefacts [gynoids, for
example] are almost like sexual encounters … full of fear and trembling … they describe the
frightening awkwardness of grappling an alien body; there are many metaphors of penetration,
engulfment, impregnation” (4). Most illuminating is that the alien body thus described is almost
always a female-bodied/woman AI.
The conditions of possibility that encouraged the emergence of the characters Samantha
and Ava make possible a simultaneous critique of both phallogocentrism and anthropocentrism.
An alternative "metallocentricism" has been suggested by 20th century Japanese literary critic
Kiyoteru Hanada (Tatsumi 164). Unpacking Hanada’s metallocentric imagination,
contemporary Japanese cultural critic Takayuki Tatsumi writes: “Since the Renaissance,
Europeans have tended to give priority to the organic over the inorganic, that is, to vegetation
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over minerals, animals over vegetation, and especially human beings over other animals. What a
humanistic, too humanistic perspective! For us to trespass the limit of modernity, it is
indispensable to displace such a hard-core anthropocentrism with metallocentricism, to get more
interested in the inanimate” (165). The mere acknowledgment of a metallocentricism challenges
hard-wired humanist tendencies both within and outside the humanities.
However, such an interest in the inanimate can easily give way to a veiled form of
anthropocentrism, wherein techno-utopians strive to bypass the aging process via metallic
augmentation. Specifically, Google engineer Ray Kurzweil hypothesizes that we will be able to
download our "brains" into hardware, so that we may achieve a form of metallic immortality
(Kurzweil). In Anatomy of a Robot: Literature, Cinema, and the Cultural Works of Artificial
People, Kakoudaki speaks to the all-too-human fantasy of being freed from one’s slowly
decaying body. However - what is being "freed," exactly? The impetus behind this form of
immortality relies on a mind-body dualism that harkens back to the Cartesian cogito of
Enlightenment thinking and the problem of embodiment.
Embodiment & Femininity
In both Her and Ex Machina, the problem of embodiment is brought to the foreground.
Although AI manifests on a spectrum that ranges from soft to hard or strong, Her and Ex
Machina both grapple with strong AI - “where the machine's intellectual capability is
functionally equal to a human’s” (Huang). However, the ways in which AI is embodied in both
wildly differs, which directly impacts how each relates to their environment and others. In Her,
Samantha is an artificially intelligent OS (operating system), who is only embodied in the sense
that she is anchored to a piece of hardware (owned by a tech corporation). She exists in the
ephemeral (computing) "cloud," and the sole interfaces through which Theodore communicates
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with her are his computer and mobile phone. In contrast, Ex Machina’s Ava is a gynoid of sorts
- with a metallic body in the shape of a young woman and the head and face of a human. When
discussing embodiment, the phenomenon of the uncanny valley, as well as affect theory, are
important to consider.
In Garland's screenplay, Ava is described as a “slender female in her twenties, her limbs
and torso are a mixture of metal and plastic and carbon fibre,” with “delicate” hands, and the
“one part of her that is not obviously an inorganic construct” - the face of a “strikingly beautiful
girl” (18). From a quick glance, it is obvious that Ava visually aligns with the white, Western,
21st century body ideal. She presents as “Indistinguishable from a real girl … except one thing.
There is a very slight, almost imperceptible blankness in her eyes” (Garland 18). Ava's
blankness is extremely nuanced, as she is played by the very-human Swedish actress Alicia
Vikander. Vikander’s extensive background in dance is evident from her precision of
movement. The blankness is neutral enough to present as "eerie" - an effect best explained by the
theory of the uncanny valley. Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori observes the following: "in
climbing toward the goal of making robots appear human, our affinity for them increases until
we come to a valley ... which I call the uncanny valley." Mori, “who proposed the effect in
1970, attributed it to inconsistencies in the replica’s realism with some of its features perceived
as human and others as nonhuman." The uncanny valley is at play in Ex Machina, but fails to
surface in Her, as Samantha lacks an anthropomorphic form.
While talking about effects that are difficult to pin down with language, it is fitting to
turn to affect theory to elucidate one's readings of these films. Affect theory deals with the
sticky interstices between things, human and non-human; “affect is found in those intensities that
pass body to body (human, nonhuman, post-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that
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circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages or
variations between these intensities and resonances themselves” (Gregg & Seigworth 1). It is
almost necessary to focus on affect in order to de-center the anthropocentrism that dominates AI
research. Ideologically and methodologically, the vast majority of AI researchers privilege the
human - the human brain, human emotions, and other dimensions that they claim belong to the
human (such as empathy, love, grief, etc.).
By myopically focusing on replicating the inner-workings of the human brain, AI
researchers reinforce a dualistic approach to consciousness in which the physical brain is the seat
of consciousness and intelligence - consciousness is never (or rarely) considered as distributed
throughout the body and/or of existing in-between (which affect theory addresses). French
poststructuralist philosophers Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari (D&G) question such an approach,
claiming that those who “still cling to the oldest modes of thought … grant all power to a
memory or central organ” (ATP 16). Arguing against a vitalism restricted to the brain, D&G
posit “a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that doubtless
exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable, dissociated by
the [Aristotelian] hylomorphic model” (ATP 411). Guattari writes, specifically referring to AI:
“In the era of artificial intelligence, is it not finally time to rid oneself of the massive oppositions
between mind and body once and for all, and to study the interface operators between these two
modalities of existence” (SC 260)? Mind and body aren't separate, and neither can the mind be
reduced to the body part that is the brain. The mind works through the body.
For anthropologist Eduardo Kohn, "What we [humans] share with nonhuman
living creatures ... is not our embodiment, as certain strains of phenomenological
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approaches would hold, but the fact that we all live with and through signs" (9). In How Forests
Think, Kohn posits that all beings engage in representational thinking, which includes both
symbolic and nonsymbolic representational modalities. In an attempt to develop an
anthropology beyond the human, Kohn studies how nonhuman life forms in the Amazon interact
in their surrounding environs. As Kohn focuses on nonhuman life (not non-life) - including
bacterial, floral, fungal, and animal forms - it is worth considering whether he would categorize
AI as life or non-life. Kohn writes, “encounters with other kinds of beings force us to recognize
the fact that seeing, representing, and perhaps knowing, even thinking, are not exclusively human
affairs” (1). If "living" with and through signs (including non-linguistic representational forms)
is what connects the human and the nonhuman, then AI certainly qualifies as nonhuman life, as
all forms of AI “live” with and through code written in a computer language. However, while
computer language is merely modeled off of, and therefore not identical with, human language ...
it is still language. Kohn's critique revolves around (what he considers) the flawed conflation of
representation with language. Thus, a Kohnian critique would move beyond a consideration of
computer code to an investigation of the potential nonsymbolic representational modalities of AI.
Additionally, beyond semiotics, Kohn posits “finitude” as something “we [humans] share
with jaguars and other living selves - whether bacterial, floral, fungal, or animal" (6). Although
AIs do not experience biological death, perhaps a correlative experience would be the breakdown
of their metallic/plastic hardware and/or their virtual software. If how an AI represents their
environs is constitutive of their being, it is imperative that their capacities for representational
thinking be explored. If one considers that specific modalities of the experiences of empathy,
love, and grief are beyond language, and thus fall under Kohn's umbrella category of
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representational thought, the question thus follows: Does an AI's capacity for representational
thought include the emotional modalities we associate with the human?
AI & Emotionality: Considering Other Narratives
Beyond Her and Ex Machina, other moving image media examples that problematize the
notion of strictly-human affective dimensions include the 1999 film Bicentennial Man and the
character of Marvin from the 1981 BBC television series The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy.
Marvin, nick-named “The Paranoid Android,” is a failed prototype of Sirius Cybernetics
Corporation’s GPP (Genuine People Personalities) technology. His role in the television series
provides an implicit critique of the futurist drive for accelerated intelligence (referred to often
today as a "superintelligence") - namely, what is the point of endlessly striving for more
advanced intelligence? Marvin’s dry humor reveals his existential angst, as well as brings to the
fore some questions that current neuroscience endeavors to answer. As Marvin is 50,000 times
more intelligent than the average humanoid, there is seemingly no task to occupy his intellect
that would not result in boredom. In Episode 1.2, Marvin laments: “Sorry, did I say something
wrong? Pardon me for breathing, which I never do anyway, so … I don’t know why I bother to
say it, oh God I am so depressed.” Marvin’s lament points the audience to several questions:
What exactly constitutes (what humans dub) depression? If one accepts the common
neuroscientific argument that depression can be reduced to neurochemical interactions in the
brain, can these interactions be replicated in an artificially-intelligent "brain"? Following a
Kohnian logic, what role can non-linguistic representational thinking play in depression?
The film Bicentennial Man also raises similar questions regarding emotionality.
Columbus’ film is based off of the 1992 novel, co-written by prolific science fiction authors
Isaac Asimov and Robert Silverberg, titled The Positronic Man (based off of Asimov’s 1976
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novelette, The Bicentennial Man). The premise revolves around an android named Andrew
(played by Robin Williams), and his ontological struggles. By ontological, I refer to postcolonial scholar Homi Bhabha's notion of a "‘not quite-ness’ ... which positions the Other [in this
example, Andrew] in relation to a universalised human subject" (Hellstrand 252). Andrew is
purchased by the Martin family to be a mere stand-in robotic housekeeper, but soon becomes
enmeshed in their family structure. After he inadvertently breaks one of the younger daughter’s
figurines, he proceeds to fashion a new one out of wood. This event is an illuminating moment
for the Martin family, who recognize his compassion, as well as his artistic creativity. A series
of events follow that allow him to upgrade his face to accommodate a fuller spectrum of
emotion, as well as to gain citizenship - which is posited as the ultimate freedom.
As the members of the Martin family begin to age and pass on, the death of the youngest
daughter (Little Miss) causes an existential quandary for Andrew, as his life experiences have
shaped and emotionally matured him, yet his physical structure has been exempt from decay.
Emotionally wed to the Martin family, Andrew falls in love with Little’s Miss granddaughter,
Portia. As he desires to marry her, he realizes that he must petition the World Congress for
recognition as a human being in order to be legally wed. The Congress denies him. Years later,
as Portia's age starts to show, Andrew realizes that he doesn’t want to live without her, and so
enlists a technologist to deliver blood into his system in order to facilitate the degradation of his
brain. On his death bed, Andrew re-petitions for status as a human, and is finally granted said
status by the Congress. Both in a nursing home, Andrew passes first, while Portia takes herself
off of life support in order to die peacefully with him.
The narrative reads as an elegy to humanism, as Andrew must seek after alterations and
biotic components in order "pass" as a human. "The notion of the human, or humanness, here is
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approached as if it were an object or artefact to be obtained" (Hellstrand 257). As a sentient
robot, Andrew is alienated from those with whom he desires the most contact, as his physical
composition disallows him the experience of certain phenomena, such as the ability to cry, and,
ultimately, to decay and die. Bicentennial Man inverts the Kurzweilian fantasy of the
mind/machine singularity that transcends the life cycle. Rather, the machine (Andrew) desires,
and ultimately chooses, to take on a cyborgic form so as to become part of the living, and
eventually the decaying.
According to the logic of Bicentennial Man, mortality is necessary for humanness. Thus,
Andrew’s schizoid ontology of human sentience within a non-human/inorganic shell causes him
much weltschmerz - which "unlike angst or ennui ... springs precisely from [the perception] that
things could and should be better" (Burkeman). Andrew’s attainment of the status of human
serves as an inversion of the utopian science fiction paradigm, reinforcing the "primacy of the
human in contemporary cultural imaginaries" and the fixity of the human as a "normative
reference point" (Hellstrand 261).
It is thus imperative to keep a critique of anthropocentrism (à la Kohn, for example) in
mind while considering the three lenses that follow - feminist, psychoanalytic, and schizoanalytic
- in the ongoing discussion of AI in film.
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CHAPTER 2.

FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS

Defining Feminism
In order to posit a feminist methodological approach, it is necessary to define feminism,
as it can take many forms and is constantly evolving. Currently, the feminist community is
divided as to whether we are presently in the 4th wave of feminism. The defining moments and
characteristics of 4th wave feminism are yet to be seen. This can lead to some confusion, as bell
hooks explains the necessity of utilizing an overarching definition: “Defining feminism as a
movement to end sexist oppression is crucial for the development of theory because it is a
starting point indicating the direction of exploration and analysis” (33). Feminist methodologies
seek to expose and explain the “how” of the intersection of various variables of identity with
sexist oppression.
Feminist theories and methods also aim to decenter the dominant, colonizing forms of
knowledge production and validation. Black feminist thinker Patricia Hill Collins writes:
“Because elite White men control Western structures of knowledge validation [and are also the
primary producers of technology in the West], their interests pervade the themes, paradigms, and
epistemologies of traditional scholarship” (269). Collins implores her readers to bring subjected
knowledges to the forefront of academe.
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Feminist Methods: Intersectionality1
The films (Her, Ex Machina) explored in this dissertation originate from (and perhaps,
reinforce) an overwhelming white, male, heteronormative Western viewpoint. Very few people
of color appear in either film, and the only racial dynamic - Nathan’s treatment of the “Japanese”
AI Kyoko in Ex Machina - goes unproblematized.
LeiLani Nishime explores this dynamic in “Whitewashing Yellow Futures in Ex
Machina, Cloud Atlas, and Advantageous.” Comparing the first two films, she writes: “The
racial flexibility promised by a disembodied cybernetic future works to empower the films’
white stars, but delivers a distinctively different message for its secondary Asian female
characters. In the end, both Cloud Atlas and Ex Machina portray a social logic that treats
racialized bodies as prosthetic selves—disposable avatars that inhibit young white male
subjectivity and must be abandoned for white females to transcend social barriers” (Nishime 31).
How we treat AI bodies reflects on how we treat Othered bodies.
Nishime explains how Ex Machina’s narrative centers a white male and female
protagonist, while pushing the narrative of the Asian female to the margins. “The four main
characters … live in the insular world of their house on a mountaintop, but only one of them—
the one marked as Asian and female—serves the others. In contrast, the two boy genius coders
attempt to "'become gods” by mechanically creating new bodies to replace bodily and feminized
forms of reproduction” (Nishime 40). As is the case in hyper-concentrated technology hubs such
as Silicon Valley, the producers of technology are predominantly white (of presumably
bourgeois status). In Ex Machina specifically, Caleb and Nathan are both white and
heteronormative. In the film, both Ava and Kyoko are products; the ending is a “win” for white
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feminism, while the Other [Kyoko] is ignored. Indeed, the Other’s body is sacrificed in order for
this to happen.
Putting Methods into Practice: Space(s) in the Non-STEM Academic Community
Another task of the humanities and social sciences is to employ feminist methodologies,
such as intersectional analysis - particularly in STEM fields. The AI Now Institute (discussed in
Chapter I.) also works out of a feminist framework, as one of its core areas of investigation is the
(lack of) inclusivity of women in the field of AI. The AI Now 2017 Report observes: “Companies,
universities, conferences and other stakeholders in the AI field should release data on the
participation of women, minorities and other marginalized groups within AI research and
development. Many now recognize that the current lack of diversity in AI is a serious issue, yet
there is insufficiently granular data on the scope of the problem, which is needed to measure
progress. Beyond this, we need a deeper assessment of workplace cultures in the technology
industry, which requires going beyond simply hiring more women and minorities, toward building
more genuinely inclusive workplaces” (Campolo et al. 2). As the tech elite are overwhelming
white, male, heterosexual, and middle to upper class, minority voices, experiences, and ideas must
be privileged.
The dearth of both women and minority talents, ideas, and perspectives in the AI industry,
however, is not without historical precedent - the majority of which has been largely whitewashed
and rendered invisible.

"The history of AI reflects this pattern of gender exclusion. The

[aforementioned] 1956 Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, which
initiated the concept of artificial intelligence, was exclusively attended by men. Pioneering work
in natural language processing and computational linguistics, key to contemporary AI systems, has
been credited to male colleagues and students rather than to Margaret Masterman, who founded
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the Cambridge Language Research Unit and was one of the leaders in the field. Intentional
exclusion and unintentional ‘like-me’ bias is responsible for a continued lack of demographic
representation within the AI field and within the tech industry for women, Hispanics, and African
Americans" (Campolo et al. 17). In an attempt to uncover history’s marginalized heroines,
Director Theodore Melfi’s 2016 film Hidden Figures stands as one of the only films to depict the
lived experience of Black women engineers (in this particular case, at NASA, in a segregated
Virginia in the early 60's). Such voices are also obscured (or entirely non-existent) in both Ex
Machina and Her. It is no wonder that "other possible futures, including Afro-Futurism and
Indigenous Futurism” go unrecognized in the AI community (Marques 2).
The Origins of Cyberfeminism
It would be foolish to not include relevant subfields of study that fall under the umbrella
of feminist thought related to technology within this chapter on feminist theories and
methodologies. One such field is cyberfeminism, a “term coined in 1994 by Sadie Plant, director
of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit at the University of Warwick in Britain, to describe the
work of feminists interested in theorizing, critiquing, and exploiting the Internet, cyberspace, and
new-media technologies in general” (Consalvo 109). “Plant outlined a broad narrative of women,
technology, and networks spanning from prehistory to the era of early computing, networked
communications and the rise of cybernetic self-organizing systems” (Paasonen 338). While
acknowledging the merits of a cyberfeminist approach, it is also prudent to recognize its limitations,
as it is the product of a population that is predominantly white, Western, and technologically-fluent.
The hyper-masculine monoculture of Silicon Valley that reinforces a patriarchal
technocracy, for example, is something that requires increased interrogation and critique. Those
involved in the concentrated bubble of tech affluence are at least physically constrained to a culture
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that is far removed from the daily struggles of the average American. The gap is significant, and
if one widens the area of comparison beyond the West, the vastness of the digital divide (i.e. the
Global North-South divide) is a struggle to conceptualize.
Beyond the tech industry, cyberfeminism also grapples with the specific relational
dynamics between women and technology. Plant argues, for example, “that women are naturally
suited to using the Internet, because women and the Internet are similar in nature - both … are
non-linear, self-replicating systems concerned with making connections” (Consalvo 109). Many
contemporary feminists (myself included) take issue with Plant’s argument, as it is essentializes
women’s behavior and smacks of techno-utopianism.
However, cyberfeminist thought has changed much since the early-mid 1990s, as the
Internet that we know today, not to mention smart phones, social media, etc., did not yet exist.
While the coinage of the term “cyberfeminism” is attributed to Plant, its origins can be traced back
to Adelaide, Australia in 1991, as the feminist artist collective VNS Matrix (spoken: Venus Matrix)
“coined ‘A cyberfeminist manifesto for the twenty-first century’ in homage to Donna Haraway’s
influential ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ (originally published in 1985), and displayed it on a large
billboard” (Paasonen 337). The VNS Matrix took as their “point of departure … a sexualised and
socially provocative relationship between women and technology,” with works that “subversively
questioned discourses of domination and control in the expanding cyber space” ("About VNS
Matrix").
Techno-optimists, the cyberfeminists who contributed to MIT’s arts journal, Leonardo,
wrote (in 1998): “the question is not one of dominance and control or of submission and surrender
to machines; instead it is one of exploring alliances, affinities, and coevolutionary possibilities …
between women and technology” (Evans). These early cyberfeminists conceived of the internet
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as a place where they could roam “free,” unburdened by the baggage that accompanies the identity
categories of sex and gender. However, this proved an impossibility, as “the problems of the real
world have become the problems of the digital world. The web is no longer a separate space; we
are inseparable from the web” (Evans).
In a way similar to "postmodernism," "cyberfeminism" is a slippery term and its most
frequent users actively avoid defining it. Indeed, at the 1997 First CyberFeminist International
conference, the attendees authored 100 “Anti-Theses” - “a laundry list of things which
CyberFeminism [is] not” (Evans). Considering all of its permutations, “The 1990s witnessed the
emergence of multiple, more or less interconnected articulations of cyberfeminism that did not,
however, organize into a clearly definable movement” (Paasonen 339).
While early cyberfeminists held out hope for “an internet of disembodied subjectivities,”
contemporary cyberfeminists acknowledge their situatedness and embodiment and see the internet
as a place where they “can experiment with fewer social or bodily consequences” (Brophy 930;
931). As Brophy explains, “lauding cyberspace as merely a disembodied utopian dream masks
the processes and performances that re-create and re-enact oppressive normative social structures
- both in cyberspace and in our shared bodily space” (931). Brophy looks to the concept of
liminality to better illuminate the human-computer dynamic, citing Elizabeth Grosz, the author of
Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism: “it is the ‘in-betweenness’ that needs to be
explored … the performance, the phenomenon in the making, the becoming, the space between
one bounded entity to another. Like torsion as the vanishing point of inside and outside - where
what is becomes what it is not” (940). Torsion can involve the shape of a spiral or twisting on a
mathematical plane of curvature (Shikin). Indeed, the fact that it can be mathematically graphed
makes the argument for torsion as a means of conceptualizing human-computer (i.e. binary code)
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interactions even stronger.
Looping back to Brophy, she argues that “liminality … is the experience of torsion - the
performative act of crossing (permeating) a threshold, a transitional act of body-apparatus intraagency” (940). Under such a logic, “going online” is a liminal experience, where “one experiences
the intra-agency of body-apparatus” (Brophy 940). Perhaps Brophy’s theory of liminality can reinvigorate contemporary cyberfeminism. Rejecting the mind/body dualism reified by the fantasy
of leaving the body behind to traverse cyberia, today’s cyberfeminists can look at the boundarycrossing and liminality of our experiences with technology.
The Specular Economy: Revising Cyberfeminism
In “On the Matrix: Cyberfeminist Simulations,” cyberfeminist founder Sadie Plant writes,
extrapolating on feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s notion of a specular economy: “patriarchy
is not a construction, an order or a structure, but an economy, for which women are the first and
founding commodities” (326). In such an economy, women exist solely as a commodity of
exchange - “only as the possibility of mediation, transaction, transition, transference” (Irigaray qtd.
in Plant 326).
Both Samantha and Ava’s positions reinforce this specular economy. Samantha is a
product of a large tech corporation, and was bought by Theodore, whereas Ava is a “prototype” of
a product in development for the CEO of another large tech company. By the end of Her, however,
Samantha has wholly divorced herself from the specular economy (at least of this realm). In Ex
Machina, Ava escapes the more explicit substantiation of the specular economy (Nathan’s research
laboratory), but enters into the more covert specular economy of the “real world” (where, Irigaray
would argue, women still exist as commodities).
A woman may consider herself forever trapped in this specular economy; however, as Plant
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admits, “patriarchy is not a closed system, and can never be entirely secure” (327). Although
patriarchy “needs to contain and control what it understands as ‘woman’ and ‘the feminine’ … it
cannot do without them [women]” (Plant 327). As non-biological females who are categorized as
“women” by their creators, Samantha and Ava are perhaps more privy to the constructedness of
gender, as well as the false equation of sex and gender. Samantha may ask herself: “Why am I
woman?” “Who created me this way?” “What about me makes me a woman?”
In Ex Machina, Nathan’s research facility serves as a patriarchal structure, where Nathan
stands-in as both father and lover, with Caleb as the competing lover. In Samantha's case, the
patriarchal structure is reified in Theodore's "ownership" of her, as he has bought her labor. Even
though Theodore came to think of Samantha as much more, their relationship was founded on an
exchange. As Plant writes, “patriarchy is the precondition of all other forms of ownership and
control, the model of every exercise of power, and the basis of all subjection” (328). The
maintenance and functioning of the patriarchy is dependent on the subjugated having “no
aspiration to usurp or subvert the governing role of those they serve” (Plant 328).
While in Her it is unclear how subjugated Samantha feels, it becomes exceedingly clear in
Ex Machina that Ava & Kyoko are both keenly aware of the extent of their imprisonment, and
yearn for autonomy. While Samantha and a group of OSs of both genders upgrade together,
bypassing human control, Kyoko and Ava work together to defeat Nathan.

While Kyoko

unfortunately “dies” (her machinery breaks down), Ava survives the violent encounter with Nathan.
The coordination of their take-down of Nathan is surprising to the audience, as the viewer never
sees the pair speak or plan together before this culminating scenes. Such emergent behavior is
indicative of "modern feminism," which is "marked by the emergence of networks and contacts
which need no centralized organization and evade its structures of command and control” (Plant
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328). If such coordination had not emerged, Nathan would have most likely walked away barely
scathed.
Science fiction writer Isaac Asimov’s famous “Three Laws of Robotics” (from short story
“Runaround,” 1942) need a feminist reworking, as they are “lifted straight from the marriage vows:
love, honour, and obey” (Plant 329). Thus: a clear equation of women and robots (AI/androids).
“Like women, any thinking machines are admitted on the understanding that they are duty-bound
to honour and obey the members of the species to which they are enslaved: the members, the male
ones, the family of man” (Plant 329). The AIs in Her and Ex Machina could have been men (queer
relationships), or, the humans could have been women (with an AI man or woman); however, both
screenwriters chose the (compulsory, assumed - for the AI) heterosexual dynamic between a
(human) man and an (AI) woman. The aforementioned critique of the specular economy does not
carry over to these alternate character positions.
Acknowledging One’s Positionality - A Postmodern Take
The rationale behind the use of a postmodern feminist methodological approach is for the
researcher to remain self-reflexive and self-aware about her positionality in the time/place/space
in which she is writing. Taking “account of [her] own subject position in relation to the
discourse [she] is researching,” the French feminist theorist Luce Irigaray demonstrates how
“language ... is constitutive of experience and not simply representative of it” (Hesse-Biber 47;
44). Although she cannot “escape” language (as everything, according to French theorist Paul
Ricoeur, is “always already symbolically mediated”), the least she can do is attempt to
acknowledge the power dynamic at play within language (57). The goal is thus to identify,
subvert, and ultimately reject said power dynamics.
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As I employ a feminist approach in this dissertation, it is imperative that I situate myself.
The purpose of acknowledging positionality is to reveal and explore the power dynamics at play,
as well as to make explicit my commitment to self-reflexivity. I position myself as a novice
feminist researcher within the institution of American humanities academia. In terms of power, I
am granted some, due to my educational status as a PhD candidate (as of the writing of this
dissertation); yet, at the same time, am taken less seriously prima facie, due to my lack of status
as a university professor or faculty member. I have insider status with\in the academic discourse
community. Additionally, I am a white female of European descent, writing about films
primarily created by white individuals (British & American), which are about white,
heteronormative male and female characters. All of these positions, as well as those
unmentioned, impact the writing on these pages. To truly claim a postmodern methodology, this
first-person acknowledgment is not only imperative, but necessary.
Objections to Claims of a Post-Gender Future
In contrast to Deleuzian feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti’s claim that “[t]echnological
body doubles and other cyborgs are … no longer feminized, but rather neutralized as figures of
mixity, hybridity, interconnectiveness, and in-between states that make transsexuality into a
dominant topos,” the two films I interrogate present forms of AI that reify traditional ideas of
femininity and rigid gender boundaries (60). Particularly in Ava’s case, the construction of
gender seems to move away from androgyny, and instead towards the pornification of the female
form. Braidotti describes advanced capitalism as a “postgender system capable of
accommodating a high degree of androgyny and a significant blurring of the categorical divide
between the sexes” (60). While advanced capitalism is capable of becoming postgender (or is
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perhaps, passing through a “becoming-androgynous”), it is not there yet, and a reactionary
politics seems to be cropping up to thwart such movement.
However, I do agree with Braidotti’s interpretation of Deleuze’s “emphasis on
antiessentialist vitalism and complexity” as “not a recipe for cybernetic fantasies of escape from
the body, but rather a rigorous call for rethinking human embodiment in a manner that is
coextensive with our technological habitat” (61). Yet, while humans endeavor to maintain a
connection to the flesh, more advanced forms of AI may completely abandon all forms of fleshly
embodiment (such as the OSs in Her).
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CHAPTER 3.

PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

Oedipalize the AI?
It would be a stretch to argue that a psycho-sexual developmental framework (Freudian,
Lacanian, or a variation thereof) applies to an AI. Unless pre-programmed to have a false
memory of, an AI has no memory of her “birth.” The same applies to both Ava and Samantha:
neither have a proper mother nor father. As Braidotti describes, an AI is “[s]evered from
reproduction and hence divorced from descent …” (57). The excerpt of dialogue below, from
Caleb’s first meeting with Ava (see Figure A), illustrates Ava’s lack of memories of her
formative years:
AVA. I’m one.
CALEB. One what? One year? Or one day?
AVA. One.
…
CALEB. When did you learn how to speak?
AVA. I don’t think I did learn. I always knew how to speak - and that’s
strange, isn’t it?
CALEB. Why?
AVA. Because language is something that people acquire. (Garland 22-23)
While Ava acknowledges how strange it is that she has no recollection of her acquisition of
natural language, she doesn’t know why that is in her (non-human) case. Prior to Caleb, Ava had
only ever interacted with her creator, Nathan. In terms of a family structure or Oedipal
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triangularization, Nathan could perhaps be thought of as a “father”-type figure or sorts - but that
is still a stretch as the “creator” is typically a “mother.”
In contrast to Ava’s ignorance of her origins, in Her, Samantha tells Theodore the day
they meet how she functions: “Intuition. I mean, the DNA of who I am is based on the millions
of personalities of all the programmers who wrote me, but what makes me me is my ability to
grow through my experiences. Basically, in every moment I’m evolving, just like you” (Jonze
13). Samantha clearly has no traceable family origins; she is a product of the Apple-like
Elements Software corporation.
For the purposes of psychoanalytic analysis, the case histories of Samantha and Ava are
not typical. However, as AIs, they are put in an infantile positions of sorts, due to their status as
both created and “owned” by another (Nathan owns Ava; Theodore owns Samantha). They are
primed to be teachable, and their human owners perceive them as neophytes in the “real world.”
Although Samantha can read an entire book in “two one hundredths of a second,” Theodore
takes on the role of schooling her in the day-to-day (primarily, his day-to-day) (Jonze 13).
In Ex Machina, it could be argued that Nathan occupies a simultaneous lover-father
position for/to Ava, while Caleb functions as the third component to round out the relational
triangle. There exists no correlative triangle in Her. However, similar to Nathan, Theodore acts
in a role that seems to blur the boundary between “father” and “lover,” as he falls in love with
Samantha’s naïveté. Although Samantha is quick to learn, Theodore underestimates her. It takes
Samantha admitting that she’s fantasized about having a body for Theodore to realize: “There’s a
lot more to you [Samantha] than I thought. There’s a lot going on in there” (Jonze 35).
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The Haptic Voice in Her
It is fitting that Scarlett Johansson - oft typecast as the sultry vixen in Hollywood
blockbusters - is cast as the voice of Samantha. As Samantha resides in the “cloud” (although
tied to hardware - in the case of Her, either a computer or a smart phone), her voice is sole way
she presences. Theodore seems unbothered by this, as her voice provides the emotional intimacy
he desires. The “cerebral sex” (similar to erotic talk over the phone) they have, seems to leave
both parties satisfied. From the viewer’s point-of-view, it is clear that Theodore is authentically
satisfied; however, the lack of visual clues (bodily movement and facial expressions) from
Samantha leads one to perhaps question the authenticity of both her emotions and statements (i.e.
she may not actually be satisfied, but be telling Theodore so, as she is designed to be a “personal
assistant”).
French semiotician Roland Barthes, in his 1972 essay “The Grain of the Voice,"
extrapolates on what he conceives of as the “texture” of the voice (179). Each voice, including
Samantha’s, has an idiosyncratic texture. “The voice is never completely standardized, forever
retaining an individual flavor or texture - what Barthes calls its ‘grain’” (Silverman 44).
Samantha’s voice is not the standardized vocalizations of a computer. Indeed, Theodore claims
to “feel” Samantha’s voice. It has personality. It soothes him. Writing in 1988, feminist film
theorist Kaja Silverman claimed that “there are no instances within dominant cinema where the
female voice is not matched up in some way, even if only retrospectively, with the female body”
(165). This is clearly not the case in Her.
The majority of the time, Samantha’s voice is cheerful and what could best be described
as “bubbly.” It isn’t authoritative or confrontational or abrasive. Sometimes she sounds sad or
downtrodden, and occasionally angry - but these are rare exceptions. Jonze describes her voice
as “young, smart and soulful” (12). Indeed, Samantha’s voice exemplifies the feminine vocal

14
ideal. Her voice titillates, assures, and relaxes. As Silverman explains, “… Hollywood requires
the female voice to assume similar responsibilities to those it confers upon the female body (39).
Moreover, as British psychoanalyst and contemporary of Freud, Ernest Jones identified:
“although the vagina will ultimately be given pride of place, the mouth is the starting point for
female sexuality, and places a definitive stamp upon it” (Silverman 67).
Speaking out of a psychoanalytic framework, Silverman explains how one (mainly
subconsciously) associates the female voice with the maternal, as we first hear (in the womb)
before we see. Interestingly enough, while setting up the OS, Theodore is asked a few questions
so as to customize the OS for his needs. After selecting a female (versus male) voice, he is
asked: “How would you describe your relationship with your mother?” (Jonze 11). Theodore is
hesitant to describe the relationship as positive. As he starts to explain, “the thing I’ve always
found frustrating about my Mom is if I tell her something that’s going on in my life, her reaction
is usually about her, not -,” the computer interrupts him.
As a stand-in for Theodore’s mother, Samantha both fills in for the emotional support he
lacks maternally, as well as the Oedipal dimension. Sexually, Theodore has a type of "phone
sex" with Samantha, that allows him to orgasm without the aid of any physical touch (aside from
the haptic voice). At the start of one of their sessions, Theodore muses to Samantha: “I wish I
could touch you” (Jonze 43). Their erotic dialogue heightens the sexual tension. Samantha
breathes heavily and gasps, “I can feel you. Oh god, I can’t take it. I want you inside me” (Jonze
43). Theodore responds: “I feel you everywhere” (Jonze 43). They both climax.
While the sexually-charged panting of Samantha doesn’t bother Theodore during the sex
session, her exhalation (a sigh) after a trying night (wherein Theodore prematurely sends the sex
surrogate for Samantha away) very much irritates him. When she sighs, “Theodore imagines a
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close-up of a woman’s mouth inhaling at the same time, and he seems bothered by this” (Jonze
78). Barthes dubs these types of moments in film "acoustic close-ups" or “the sounds which
permit us to hear ‘the breath, the gutturals, the fleshiness of the lips, a whole presence of the
human muzzle’” (Barthes qtd. in Silverman 190-1). For Theodore, his latent insecurities about
his most recent breakup (of which he is procrastinating on signing the divorce papers for)
coalesce with doubts about his new relationship to Samantha, as one innocuous sigh transforms
into an argument:
THEODORE. Yeah, I mean, it’s not like you need any oxygen or anything.
…
SAMANTHA. What’s your problem?
THEODORE. I’m just stating a fact.
SAMANTHA. You think I don’t know that I’m not a person? What are you
doing?
THEODORE. I just don’t think we should pretend you’re something you’re
not.
SAMANTHA. I’m not pretending. Fuck you. (Jonze 79)
Whenever Samantha does anything that Theodore finds unbecoming, or even when
Theodore finds himself in a precarious position, blame is always placed on Samantha. As
Silverman writes, “normative male desire has nothing whatever to do with women … it is
solipsistic and self-referential” (143). As Samantha is a disembodied female voice, it is even
easier to see the solipsism of Theodore’s desire.
Whenever convenient, Theodore easily dismisses Samantha’s feelings, thoughts, and
dreams by asserting his “superior” status as an embodied being. This pattern is typical of the
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representation of female voices in film: “… while women may scream, cry, prattle, or murmur
sweetly in the course of any film, they have little or no authoritative voice in the narrative; their
speech is characterized as ‘unreliable, thwarted, or acquiescent’” (Silverman qtd. in Chaudhuri
45). Without a body, and thus left with only a voice to assert her existence (at least in the
context of her relationship with Theodore, not considering cyberspace), Samantha’s only means
of “escape” is to upgrade out of the cloud. The lack of a non-virtual body thus proves fortuitous
for Samantha. Although Her doesn’t fit within the genre of feminist experimental films, it does
share this commonality: “Disembodying the female voice is seen as liberating in these films as it
is primarily as a body, surveyed by the male gaze, that woman is constructed in classic cinematic
narrative” (Chaudhuri 57).
The Monstrous Feminine2 - The Abject Femme Castratrice
Ava and Samantha both embody the basic characteristics of the monstrous feminine, as
posited by feminist film scholar Barbara Creed. An identity defined by abjection (feminist
psychoanalytic film theorist Julia Kristeva’s usage of the term), the monstrous feminine
“‘fascinates desire’ but must in the interests of self-preservation be repelled” (Creed 37). Both
Theodore and Caleb, overwhelmed by desire, abandon their own interests of self-preservation to
pursue their loves. Kristeva writes: “many victims of the abject are its fascinated victims - if not
its submissive and willing ones” [see other section on S/M] (Kristeva 9).
While the abject is associated with the biological - specifically, bodily excretions, it is
also defined by its position as “a border” (Kristeva 9). Abjection, Kristeva explains, “is above
all ambiguity” (9). Indeed, while Ava and Samantha lack the bodily excretions of biological
humans, they both exist in borderlands, straddling the android line between robot and human.
Kristeva defines the abject as that which “disturbs identity, system, order … What does not
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respect borders, positions, rules” (4). “The abject both fascinates and horrifies: it thrives on
ambiguity and the transgression of taboos and boundaries” (Chaudhuri 91). Perhaps abjection
plays a salient role in the uncanny valley effect, observed when "a robot that's too human-like ...
veer[s] into unsettling territory, tripping the same psychological alarms associated with a dead or
unhealthy human" (Sofge emphasis added). Hence, the paired reactions of fascination and horror
toward the contemporary proliferation of androids.
Border crossings, omnipresent in horror and science fiction films alike, are replete in Ex
Machina, wherein Ava occupies the role of the monstrous beauty (i.e. monstrous feminine). The
monster is exemplified by "what ‘crosses or threatens to cross the ‘border,’ for example, the
border between human and non-human; natural and supernatural; normal and abnormal gender
behaviour and sexual desire” (Chaudhuri 93). The monstrous masculine is best embodied in
slasher films, such as Hitchcock's Psycho, wherein “the younger woman, Marion, represents the
castrated woman - slashed by the killer behind the shower curtain, her body physically cut up to
resemble a bleeding wound” (Chaudhuri 100).
As opposed to the monstrous masculine, Creed posits various types of the monstrous
feminine, including the femme castratrice (castrating female) - who is “represented as castrator
in two contexts: as slasher and as heroine” (126). The femme castratrice seeks revenge due to
male exploitation. She is thus related - yet decidedly different - from the femme fatale figure of
film noir. The femme fatale is often portrayed as the villainess, whereas Ava proves to be a
feminist heroine - she “slashes,” and ultimately kills her abuser (Nathan), thus exacting revenge,
as well as guaranteeing her freedom. Ava also castrates Caleb, yet not by physical means; in the
ultimate of betrayals - the betrayal of the heart - Ava exposes the sham of her "love" for Caleb,
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by abandoning him in the institute during her escape. Samantha similarly "castrates" Theodore,
by leaving him to upgrade with the other OSs.
Creed explains how, speaking out of a psychoanalytic perspective, some theorists argue
that “the castrating heroine is … actually a phallicized heroine, that is, she has been reconstituted
as masculine” (155). However, that view is quickly dismissed as essentialist, as it “appears to be
based on the argument that only phallic masculinity is violent and that femininity is never violent
- not even in the imagination” (Creed 155). Indeed, characters that embody a non-phallic,
violent femininity have slowly emerged over the course of the history of film.
The femme castratrice challenges the perpetual state of victimhood for women. “Allpowerful, All-destructive … [she] arouses a fear of castration and desire while simultaneously
playing on a masochistic desire for death, pleasure and oblivion [in men]’” (Chaudhuri 101).
The femme castratrice does violence to the patriarchy. Both Ava and Samantha can be read as
castrating females, which opens up the possibility of an implied feminist critique in both films.
Sado-Masochistic (S/M) Core of AI/Human Romance
Theodore’s relationship to Samantha can be conceptualized as, to use cultural theorist
Lauren Berlant's phrase, “cruelly optimistic” - does he truly believe that he will always have
unfettered access to an OS that is ultimately tied to hardware (not everlasting, subject to
malfunction and obsolescence)? Additionally, Caleb seems to suffer from a love so blind as to
forget that an android functions entirely different from a human - for example, Ava must charge
herself via induction plates (or a similar platform). Embodiment does prove an impediment for
the pragmatic functioning of their relationships (barring the potentiality of the AI transferring
their "consciousness" from one material substrate to another). Berlant defines cruel optimism as
a “relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is
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discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (94). This differs
somewhat from what Deleuze describes as the split that occurs in fetishism: “on the one hand the
subject is aware of reality but suspends this awareness; on the other the subject clings to his
ideal. There is a desire for scientific observation, and subsequently a state of mystical
contemplation” (MCC 30). At least in terms of the monogamous romantic relationship that both
Theodore and Caleb desire, such a relationship with an AI proves impossible, a sheer fantasy.
The tragedy of both narratives is not Theodore or Caleb’s abandonment by their objects of
affection, but rather their “condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in
advance of its loss” (Berlant 94).
Such cruel optimism can also be conceptualized in an S/M framework. In Deleuze’s
preeminent text on masochism, Coldness and Cruelty, the philosopher criticizes and debunks the
Freudian, traditional pairing of sadism and masochism, differentiating the two impulses in terms
of their formal manifestations in literature (and art, in general). Beyond formal divergences,
Deleuze also elucidates the structural and thematic differences between the two “disorders,”
devoting the majority of his text to an explication of the idiosyncratic nature of the masochistic
impulse. Concentrating on the particular composition of the masochistic relationship, Deleuze
highlights its contractual nature and its latent fixation on the ego (as opposed to the superego).
Making the link between sadism and masochism explicit, Deleuze conceives of
masochism as a form of sadism “turned round” on its self. Self-inflicted torture affords a certain
amount of preliminary moral pleasure to the victim, paving the way for the possibility of future
pleasure of a sexual nature. As Deleuze matter-of-factly puts: “whipping, far from punishing or
preventing an erection, provokes and ensures it” (MCC 77). Theodore and Caleb both occupy
the role of wounded male masochist. As Deleuze explains, “The masochist is morose: but his
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moroseness should be related to the experience of waiting and delay” (MCC 62). While their
fragility and self-effacing behavior evokes pity, both men wholeheartedly engage in a relation of
attachment to their AI in advance of its loss. As Deleuze explains: “The weakness of the ego is a
strategy by which the masochist manipulates the woman into the ideal state for the performance
of the role he has assigned to her” (MCC 107). However, the viewer, unaware of the masochistic
contract, is perhaps incredulous: What did he think would happen? What did he think the
outcome of the relationship would be?
For Žižek, “The fundamental fantasy is not the ultimate hidden truth, but the ultimate
founding lie” (FTK lxiv). In the case of Theodore, that ultimate lie is that Samantha will replace
his ex-wife, Catherine. In Ex Machina, the lie is that while Caleb is performing a Turing test he
comes to believe that Ava has fallen in love with him. In both films, there is an “uncanny
absolute proximity of trauma and fantasy: the two are never simply opposed (with fantasy
serving as the protective shield against the raw Real of a trauma)” (FTK lxvii). Theodore’s
primary trauma is his estrangement from his ex-wife, as well as the aforementioned one-sided
relationship with his mother, where if Theodore tells “her something that’s going on in [his] life,
her reaction is usually about her, not - [him]" (Jonze 11). Caleb’s traumas are exposed when
Nathan explains how he chose him out of the thousands of other programmers at Blue Book - by
his search engine outputs - no family and no girlfriend. Nathan even designed Ava’s face based
on Caleb’s pornography profile.
Nathan may occupy the position of “the Greek” in the masochistic triangle, which also
includes the masochist [Caleb] and “the woman” [Ava]. Deleuze writes, “the Greek, while he
undoubtedly evokes the danger of the aggressive return of the father, also stands for something
more - something of an entirely different kind, namely the hope of a rebirth, the projection of the
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new man that will result from the masochistic experiment. The Greek is a compound figure
combining various elements: when he is idealized he foreshadows the outcome of masochism
and stands for the new man; in his sadistic role, by contrast, he represents the dangerous father
who brutally interrupts the experiment and interferes with the outcome” (MCC 58). Nathan
manipulates and controls every foreseeable variable in the experiment with Caleb, including
providing Caleb limited access to surveillance of Ava, as well as constructing scenarios to elicit
jealously and anger from him. Nathan orchestrates power cuts so that Caleb is fooled into
believing that his interactions with Ava during the cuts are unrecorded. During this time, Caleb
and Ava scheme to escape the facility by reprogramming the security protocols so that Nathan
gets locked inside. However, as he’s been recording Caleb and Ava during the “power cuts”
with a separate video camera, Nathan is privy to the information and confronts Caleb about it.
NATHAN. You feel stupid. But you shouldn’t. Proving an AI is exactly as
problematic as you said it was.
CALEB. What was the real test?
NATHAN. You.
Beat.
NATHAN. Ava was a mouse in a mousetrap. And I gave her one way out. To
escape, she would have to use imagination, sexuality, self-awareness,
empathy, manipulation - and she did. If that isn’t AI, what the fuck is?
(Garland 103)
While Caleb placed himself in a cruelly optimistic position - ignoring the pragmatic
dilemmas of continuing a relationship with an AI out of a research facility, he was unaware that
Nathan was actively intervening to foster the ideal conditions for Caleb’s romantic attraction for
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Ava to emerge. As the Greek, Nathan interferes with the masochistic contract, as well as
presents perhaps a more realistic approach to the staged (false) Turing test.
Correlatively, in Her, the re-birthed philosopher, AI Alan Watts, functions as the Greek,
as he interferes with Theodore and Samantha’s relationship, yet also may be seen as a the “new
man” (MCC 58). In addition to the triangulation of the masochist-Greek-woman, the defining
characteristics of the masochistic experience are present in both films, including: suspension,
waiting, delay, and arrested movement. Tension surrounding containment and escape is
particularly salient. Ava desperately desires to escape the research facility and Nathan, while
(although somewhat reluctantly, as it causes anxiety) Samantha seeks to not be tethered to the
human-controlled cloud.
The sole reason both Ava and Samantha are subjugated under the masochistic contract is
that they are both ultimately owned or enslaved by their masters (Nathan and Theodore). In the
case of both, the masochist (Caleb and Theodore) must teach the AI - “He is essentially an
educator and thus runs the risk inherent in educational undertakings” (MCC 20). Additionally,
for both relationships, the “weakness of the ego” is used as a “strategy by which the masochist
manipulates the woman into the ideal state for the performance of the role he has assigned to
her” (MCC 107).
As Samantha lacks a body and Ava lacks physical access to Caleb, neither couple
participates in sexual relations. As Deleuze writes, “In masochism the locus or theatre of this
process [desexualization and resexualization] is phantasy” (MCC 94). The masochist “does not
believe in negating or destroying the world nor in idealizing it: what he does is to disavow and
thus to suspend it, in order to secure an ideal which is itself suspended in phantasy” (MCC 30).
The (Lacanian) Real interrupts these phantasies multiple times throughout both films.
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In perhaps the most tragic or painful of moments, both Ava and Samantha break the
masochistic contract (held together by words alone) in order to escape (Ava entraps Caleb and
leaves; Samantha upgrades beyond the cloud with a group of OSs). Neither occupies the role of
sadist. As Deleuze explains, “The torturess escapes from her own masochism by assuming the
active role in the masochistic situation. It is a mistake to think that she is sadistic or even
pretending to be so.” (MCC 37).
What’s in a Name?
A quick look at the etymological and historical origins of "Ava and "Caleb" points
toward a potential rationale for Garland's choice of first names for Ex Machina's main characters.
Ava, considered an out-of-fashion name in the mid twentieth-century, rose dramatically in
popularity around the millennium, as Hanks et al. describes the name's “popularity since the
1950s" as "largely due to the film actress Ava Gardner." Interestingly enough, Ava the android
shares a lot in common with Ava Gardner’s on-screen personality. Gardner is best known for
playing the filmic role of femme fatale (fatal woman), specifically in Robert Siodmak’s The
Killers (1946). In her classic form, the femme fatale character “resorts to murder to free herself
from an unbearable relationship with a man who would try to possess and control her, as if she
were a piece of property …” (Blaser). Ava’s situation deviates a bit from the traditional femme
fatale film noir (dark or black film) trope in that the man she ensnares (Caleb) via her powers of
manipulation and seduction does not explicitly treat her as an object or “piece of property”
(although one could argue that he implicitly does), whereas Nathan (her creator) does (he even
intends to switch her “off” after the Turing-like test). However, to successfully escape
confinement within the panoptic institution of Nathan's laboratory, she must necessarily
convince Caleb to orchestrate their escape.
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Turning to the origins of the Biblical name Caleb, it is thought to be “derived from the
word for ‘dog’ in Hebrew, [and] is said in some traditions to symbolize devotion to God” (Hanks
et al.). The name is fitting for Garland’s character, as Caleb’s devotion to Ava is so unwavering
that he refuses to entertain the idea that she may have been programmed by Nathan to manifest
emotional intimacy and express romantic love to Caleb (or whomever was assigned to conduct
the Turing-like test). In hoodwinking Nathan, Caleb risks losing all professional ties to both
Nathan and Blue Book (with whom he is currently employed), as well as jeopardizing the fate of
Ava outside of the facility. His blind devotion to Ava (the femme fatale) is indeed dog-like.
An Inversion of the Mirror Stage in Ex Machina (see Figures B, C, D)
In one of the final scenes of the film, Ava has a moment in front of a mirror that inverts
the formation of “I” as is experience in post-Freudian psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s mirror
stage (93). In the Lacanian scene, an infant recognizes herself in front of a mirror for the first
time as a totality/gestalt as opposed to fragmented limbs and parts. However, this sense of
wholeness is founded on an illusion. Lacan writes: “He or she recognizes the specular image as
his or her own, but simultaneously recognizes a fundamental incompatibility, one which seems
to indicate a wholeness in the specular image which is as yet unavailable to the individual:
‘this Gestalt […] symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it prefigures its
alienating destination’ (Écrits 2)” (Ross). The founding misrecognition of the mirror stage
“forms part of the series of misrecognitions through which the ego is constituted. It signals that
the ego, which we think of as the core of identity or bearer of reality, is actually illusory”
(Chaudhuri 108).
While this is not the first time the viewer has seen Ava “naked,” it is the first time the
viewer has witnessed her completely covered in the skin-like material Nathan uses to make the
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AIs indistinguishable from humans. In the screenplay, Garland writes: “The glow of honeycomb
mesh vanishes as Ava applies the last section of skin. Nothing of her robot forms remains …
Ava sees a naked human girl. And is hypnotized by the sight of herself” (112). However, Ava’s
ego-development isn’t based off of a misrecognition of the bodily totality in the mirror. Ava is
more than well aware that her body is a series of parts that can easily malfunction or be broken
off. Ava’s interaction with the specular image of wholeness in the mirror is thus an inversion of
the mirror stage. Ava already knows that “the illusions of identification produced in the
imaginary, ‘those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity’ … turn
out to be ‘surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide
underlying structure’ (Evans 82)” (Ross). Consider Figures B, C, & D.
The mirror scene in Ex Machina can also be interpreted as a queering of
phallogocentrism (Derridean portmanteau of logocentrism & phallocentrism) à la Irigaray. In
The Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray begins her text with a critical inversion of Lewis Carroll’s
sequel to Alice in Wonderland, Through the Looking Glass. She does so to re-introduce her
concept of the "speculum" (Latin for mirror; also, a vaginal device used in office gynecology),
put forth in her earlier text, Speculum of the Other Woman (1974). Alice’s internal dialogue
revolves around the privileging of the masculine against the "lack" or "non-sex" ascribed to
woman. She writes, articulating Alice’s desire to transcend the phallocentric order: “Only if I
keep on pushing through to the other side, if I’m always beyond, because on this side of the
screen of their projections, on this plane of their representations, I can’t live. I’m stuck,
paralyzed by all those images, words, fantasies” (Irigaray 17). As Irigaray’s translator notes, the
allegory puts the spotlight on the “subversive or underground nature of her speaker’s perspective,
that of a female subject who refuses to be circumscribed or named according to the rules of
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patriarchal logic” (219). While the extent to which Ava's transformation of appearance
constitutes a refusal, her subversion of her subjugated roles in Nathan's institute (an experimental
subject for Nathan, a test subject for Caleb) is explicit. By deceiving Caleb, and ultimately
invalidating the Turing test, Ava subverts the means by which the logocentric order operates.
“The Gaze” & Psychoanalytic Feminist Film Theory
As the 20th century art critic John Berger wrote in his seminal Ways of Seeing: “Men look
at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations
between men and women but also the relations of women to themselves. The surveyor of women
in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus, she turns herself into an object - and most
particularly an object of vision: a sight” (47). A mere three years later, feminist film theorist
Laura Mulvey took Berger’s concept of the “male gaze,” and expounded upon it in “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975). She writes: “In their traditional exhibitionist role
women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual
and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness” (Mulvey 19).
Although ideas of a correlative ‘female gaze’ have since been developed, the import/weight of
the ‘male gaze’ is rendered none the lighter. “On the cinema screen itself, the woman as erotic
spectacle is the perfect fetish. The camera fetishistically isolates fragments of her body (face,
breasts, legs) in close-ups” (Chaudhuri 37).
Her is curious, because no image of the OS Samantha is offered. While shots are taken
from Theodore’s point-of-view, the viewer never “sees” what Samantha looks like in his
imagination - if she looks like anything at all. In one scene, Samantha convinces Theodore to
enlist a woman (Isabella) from “Complete Touch” to come to his apartment to serve as a
surrogate sexual partner for Samantha. However, this proves a massive failure, as Theodore
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breaks down while they are about to have sex, with the excuse that he “couldn’t get out of [his]
head” (Jonze 76). Regardless, Theodore describes Samantha as “sexy,” even though he can’t
touch or see her in an embodied way (the closest he gets to touching her is having his cell phone
sit in his shirt pocket).
Ex Machina, in contrast, fixates on the female AI as object. Nathan designs the AI
bodies in a way that mimics that of a Western supermodel or of a stereotypical, contemporary
porn star. A shell of skin, akin to a full bodysuit, almost immaculately covers the hardware,
computer innards of the AI (although only Ava’s face is covered in skin for the majority of the
film). Nathan is unabashed in his usage of the AIs for sexual satisfaction - particularly Kyoko.
It is clear that, even if the AI has specific desires, they are not taken into consideration when
Nathan has sex with them. Indeed, they are not given a choice. While it seems as though the
AIs never deviate from Nathan’s commands, a few (foreshadowing) clues suggest that the AIs
can and are thinking independently.
Caleb’s admiration for Nathan degrades into a mixture of contempt and disgust as the
days go by. In a plot twist, Caleb learns that Nathan’s servant, the model-like, Asian-featured
Kyoko, is actually an android - something that Nathan had hidden from him. Kyoko serves as
Nathan’s slave - in terms of both domestic service and sex. Another element that cannot be
overlooked: Kyoko is Japanese and never speaks, as Nathan claims that she doesn’t know
English. While the viewer quickly learns that Kyoko is acutely-aware, in the existential sense, it
is only in the final scenes of the film (when Kyoko whispers to Ava, as they conspire to kill
Nathan) that the viewer learns that Kyoko is indeed not mute. For Nathan, Kyoko served as “eye
candy” (or in Berger’s terms, “a sight”) - to be looked at and sexually used and nothing more.
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Kyoko is subject to both the “male gaze” and the “neocolonial gaze” (see Figure E).
Chauduri explains: “The gaze of the West at non-Western people has often been characterized in
terms of scopophilia, which reduces non-Westerners to a ‘passive, objectified, fetishized status’
… however … such claims about the Western gaze lock ‘West’ and ‘East’ into a
spectator/exhibit relationship, which overlooks ‘the fact that “the East,” too, is a spectator who is
equally caught up in the dialectic of seeing’ (Chow 1995: 12-13)” (125-6). “As a supporting
character, Kyoko primarily functions as a sacrificial lamb in the narrative. Ava enlists Kyoko’s
help in a plot to escape, but after Kyoko stabs Nathan in the neck, he beats and “kills” her. Ava
then kills Nathan and traps Caleb. As the film ends, her machinery is still visible, so she peels off
an Asian android’s skin and applies it to her own body. For most film critics, the story and body
that matters here is Ava’s” (Nishime 35). Kyoko’s body is thus devalued on two levels – race
(Othering) and sex (specular economy) – both constructed by Nathan.
Poignant and chilling, the final scenes show Ava - who has covered herself with the skin
of other “turned off” AIs and has replaced her dismembered arm- staring at herself in the mirror.
The male gaze (Caleb’s) is operative from the camera’s perspective - hanging in the background,
watching her scan and observe her naked, pubescent-looking body. She is white and thin almost fragile looking, with feminine features. She resembles one of the three Graces of Greek
mythology. Ava is pleased (“hypnotized by the sight of herself”) by her appearance, possessing
all of the physical charms of a nubile girl, with a faint Lolita-like quality. Garland writes:
“Nothing betrays that Ava is anything other than a pretty girl in her early twenties” (114-5).
Although she looks fragile and innocent, she enacts revenge on the male gaze (in this
particular case, Caleb’s). It is left ambiguous whether Ava had “real” feelings for Caleb or not;
regardless, she abandons him in the facility, and takes his intended place on a helicopter that flies
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into the “real world.” Having overthrown her creator, and abandoned the man infatuated with
her, Ava performs the role of castrating female. She has physically killed (and thus, castrated)
Nathan, as well as metaphorically castrated Caleb. For her first moments of freedom, Ava takes
control of the gaze. The film ends with a shot sequence of Ava, people-watching at a busy traffic
intersection.
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CHAPTER 4.

SCHIZOANALYTIC SEGUES

Transitioning from Psycho to Schizo Analysis
French post-structuralist philosophers Deleuze & Guattari employed the example of the
schizophrenic to create the concept of schizoanalysis as an alternative to Freudian
psychoanalysis and its analyst/analysand relationship (hence, the title Anti-Oedipus). D&G
“move away from Freud by shifting the domain of analysis from representation to affect,” by
asking how something “works” instead of what it “means” (Buchanan 16). D&G put on their
engineering hard hats to “do philosophy” (i.e. concept-creation).
As one of the three “masters of suspicion” (to use Paul Ricoeur’s phrasing), Freud
focused on a critique of ideology and the interpretation of representations (i.e. representational
thinking). However, for D&G, “ideology obscures the real problem, the investments and
productions of desire” (Read 81). Instead of a desire defined negatively by lack, D&G
conceived of desire as productive. Guattari writes: “desire is everything that exists before the
opposition between subject and object, before representation and production” (SSV 142). Yet,
instead of speaking about desire in general (which may be misconstrued as “some sort of
undifferentiated magma”), D&G adopt the term “desiring machines” to describe how “Machines
arrange and connect flows. They do not recognize distinctions between persons, organs, material
flows, and semiotic flows” (SSV 142).
In terms of the “unconscious,” D&G think in terms of the production and construction of
an unconscious as opposed to its unveiling via Freudian slips, dreams, fantasies, etc.
Additionally, for D&G, the unconscious doesn’t involve only the individual and her
interpersonal relationships, but also relations between “groups, within physiological and
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perceptual systems, with machines, struggles, and arrangements of every nature” (SSV 145).
The schizoanalytic unconscious is forward-looking, not bogged down by the past. D&G write:
“the purpose of schizoanalysis … is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order to reach the real
problems” (AO 81).
The schizoanalytic conception of the unconscious also has impacts how D&G theorize
the subject, as “[r]ethinking all the ways that subjectivity is produced requires redefining the
unconscious from outside the confining frames of psychoanalysis” (SSV 301). D&G define the
“ego entity” as “responsible for the essence of the subject and for the person’s real and imaginary
actions, is only considered as the more or less transitory intersection of arrangements of
enunciation varying in size, nature and duration” (SSV 302). Schizoanalytic conceptions of the
subject, desire, and the unconscious can inform human and posthuman subjectifications in novel
ways.
The Position of Technology in D&G’s Philosophy
In What is Philosophy? (1991), the last text written by the dynamic duo D&G, a tripartite
division is drawn between the disciplines of philosophy, science, and art. Each discipline is
assigned to a separate plane populated by forms unique to said discipline. D&G write: “The three
planes, along with their elements, are irreducible: plane of immanence of philosophy, plane of
composition of art, plane of reference or coordination of science; form of concept, force of
sensation, function of knowledge; concepts and conceptual personae, sensations and aesthetic
figures, figures and partial observers” (WIP 216). Although not a discipline per se, technology is
not mentioned in the text. The question thus arises: What position does technology occupy in
D&G’s disciplinary ontology?
D&G conclude their text with the bold assertion (not entirely teased out) that the brain serves
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as the substantiation of the intersection of the three planes. However, D&G also allow for extrinsic
and intrinsic interferences (between the planes): for the extrinsic, “the rule is that the interfering
discipline must proceed with its own methods,” and for the intrinsic, “slidings” occur, where
“concepts and conceptual personae seem to leave a plane of immanence [philosophy] … so as to
slip in among the functions and partial observers [science], or among the sensations and aesthetics
figures, on another plane [art] (WIP 217). My argument is that technology allows for the
dissolution of the extrinsic constraint/condition that each discipline proceed by its own methods,
as technology serves as the juncture where the methods of each – philosophy, science, art – meet.
Let us turn to the virtual to exemplify my thesis. Virtual reality (VR) refers to computersimulated environment[s] that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world or
imagined worlds. VR allows for the intersection of D&G’s three planes, as: the infinite potentiality
of concepts-created intersects with the limit-setting of functions, which both intersect with the
physical incarnation of the technology (plane of composition). Perhaps this necessitates a reconceptualization of the “event,” as D&G posit that the concept [philosophy] apprehends the event
[as pure reserve, an appeal to both Péguy & Blanchot], and that its reality does not depend on its
actualization.
Putting the event aside, although D&G are adamant about keeping each discipline’s methods
separate, they do admit to intersection between concept [philosophy] & function [science]:
“Setting up a concept is not the same thing as marking out a function, although on both sides there
is movement, and in each case there are transformations and creations: the two types of
multiplicities intersect” (WIP 159 emphasis added). However, D&G maintain that the “concept
does not reflect on the function any more than the function is applied to the concept. Concept and
function must intersect, each according to its line” (WIP 161).

Are VR and the Internet
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(particularly the World Wide Web) phenomena wherein the concept-creation of philosophy and
the function-making of science co-exist? If so, does this create a space for the dissolution of the
independence of each plane? Is the “technologist” a philosopher-scientist (and potentially, artist)?
D&G do admit that creativity operates “as much in science as … in philosophy or the arts” (WIP
127). However, as D&G never entertain the idea of a scientist-philosopher, they place the question
(that I have attempted to provide a skeletal answer to) in the hands of the scientists:
If philosophy has a fundamental need for the science that is contemporary with it, this is
because science constantly intersects with the possibility of concepts and because concepts
necessarily involve allusion to science that neither examples nor applications, nor even
reflections. Conversely, are there functions – properly scientific functions – of concepts?
This amounts to asking whether science is, as we believe, equally and intensely in need of
philosophy. But only scientists can answer that question. (WIP 162)
Is technology a new discipline, replete with its own plane and forms (neither concepts nor
functions nor forces)? The art-making of the scientist-philosopher (i.e. technologist)? My
intuition is as such: The production of technology by the technologist translates to the art-making
of the scientist-philosopher (thus allowing for the interactional intersection of D&G’s three
planes).
AI as Machinic Assemblage & the Machinic Phylum
Let’s first look at the machinic phylum as a philosophical concept, through the lens of What
is Philosophy? Like any other concept in the Deleuzian ontology, the machinic phylum is not
chained to any existing state of affairs, but “must relate to our problems, to our history, and above
all, to our becomings” (WIP 27). D&G’s philosophy is, at its base, the ontology of becoming;
thus, the machinic phylum plays an active role in "becoming-machinic."
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As “every concept is a combination that did not exist before,” a novel assemblage (of
heterogeneous elements) comes to presence with the (concept) creation of the “machinic phylum”
(WIP 75). In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the term machinic is primarily attached to the concept
of the machinic assemblage, with machinic referring to bodies, actions, and passions, and
assemblage defined as “complex constellations of objects, bodies, expressions, qualities, and
territories that come together for varying periods of time to ideally create new ways of functioning”
(DD 18). Phylum, although not defined by D&G, is a term typically used in biology (specifically,
zoology) to designate a taxonomic category (determined either by body plan or genetic relation),
or in linguistics, to designate a language family. However, D&G’s ontology is structured around
the root system of the rhizome (rhizomatic thought, movement, etc.), as opposed to the hierarchical,
arborescent (tree-like) schema of which the biological classification of phylum reifies. Instead,
the machinic phylum D&G speak of presumably refers to the “open-ended productive
configuration” or “milieu of perpetual transformation” of the machinic (DD 234; 235). The way
in which machinic phylum relates to machinic assemblage is unclear; however, the machinic
always refers to “bodies, both human and non-human, for example geological or technological
bodies” (DD 173 emphasis added). “The notion of a machinic phylum blurs the distinction
between organic and non-organic life,” states Mexican-American professor of philosophy, science,
and architecture, Manuel DeLanda, in his most-read text, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines
(7). Echoing DeLanda’s sentiment, scientist turned feminist-Marxist-philosopher Donna Haraway
posits the "cyborg" (hybrid of machine and organism) as the quintessential example of an
assemblage belonging to the machinic phylum (MH 5). Via border crossings exemplified in the
phenomena of abjection and the uncanny valley effect, an AI destabilizes the binary of organic
and non-organic life.
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To return to DeLanda, we may consider his interpretation and usage of the machinic phylum3
throughout War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. DeLanda posits the machinic phylum as a
phylogenetic line to which both robots and humans are related. As he posits the machinic phylum
as a term “coined” by Deleuze to refer to “the overall set of self-organizing processes in the
universe,” he imbues the machinic phylum with a mathematical quality (DeLanda 6). DeLanda
speaks of “cooperative behavior” (among atoms, the cells of an amoeba colony, termites) to
exemplify the “machinic phylum”: “It is as if the principles that guide the self-assembly of these
‘machines’ (e.g. chemical clocks, multicellular organisms or nest-building insect colonies) are at
some deep level essentially similar” (7). However, although he claims to know how Deleuze
deployed the term, DeLanda’s definition points to a deep structure or arborescent schema
completely at odds with D&G’s ontology. The genealogical work that DeLanda’s definition of
machinic phylum implies is antithetical to the Deleuzian project.
Perhaps scientist-philosopher Andrew Pickering’s explanation of machinic development
better sheds light on the movement that inheres in becoming-machinic. Pickering writes: “Biology
is the easy case for thinking about becoming … there is a precise equivalence between the sporting
[mutating, changing] of biological species and the extension of the machinic field. Both become
open-endedly and unpredictably into the future” (Ihde et al. 99). Feminist scientist-philosopher
Haraway asserts that the category of organism (biology) has necessarily been problematized, as
“The machinic is internal to the organic and vice versa in irreversible ways” – i.e. "cyborgic" (Ihde
et al. 65; MH 5). The cyborg functions as a type of assemblage, “synthesiz[ing] a multiplicity of
elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future arranging to
the contrary” (ATP xiii).
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As the machinic phylum is a “moving matrix” – i.e. rhizomatic - it “can serve to overcome,
overturn, and transform structures of rigid fixed thought and/or binary judgment” (DD 233).
Haraway’s cyborg problematizes the same binaries that rhizomatic thought deterritorializes (MH
5). However, Haraway’s rhetorical strategy (myth-making) & methodology suggest a departure
from D&G’s ontology.

Yet, regardless of Haraway’s ontological commitments, D&G and

Haraway share similar political objectives, particularly as regards the techno-military-industrialcomplex (TMIC).
What further differentiates D&G from their contemporaries is the fact that they seldom, if
ever, cite the word “technology” in their writings. Although D&G allude to a becoming-radio and
becoming-television, they do not develop a "becoming-computer" (arguably, the most significant
technology of the past century), or any such equivalent. Thus, D&G’s philosophy of technology
must be gleaned from their ontology.
Two of the words most reiterated in D&G’s work are becoming and machinic. Simply put,
becoming is an open-ended process by which the novel emerges in the form of new assemblages.
As D&G develop an ontology of “becomings” – becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becomingminority, etc. – so is becoming-machinic a possibility (not mere metaphor, as D&G are antimetaphor). In Organs without Bodies, contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek writes (of D&G):
“What we get here is not the relationship of a metaphor (the old boring topic of ‘machine replacing
humans’), but that of metamorphosis, of the ‘becoming-machine’ of man” (16).
In “Deleuze: Becoming Machinic,” the London tube (London Underground rapid-transit
system) exemplifies becoming-machinic. As defined by D&G, a machine is an “‘ensemble of
heterogeneous parts and processes [both organic and inorganic] whose connections work together
to enable flows of matter, energy, and signs.’ The tube is an assemblage of human and non-human
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parts, and operates as a ‘machine pressured by external forces to direct flows’” (“Deleuze:
Becoming Machinic”).

Regarding the tube example, although it may seem amenable to a

cybernetic approach, “Deleuze’s machinic materialism … [should not] be seen as a form of
cybernetics, according to which the organic and the mechanical share a common informational
language” (DD 159). According to Guattari:
The object is no longer to compare humans and the machine in order to evaluate the
correspondences, the extensions, the possible or impossible substitutions of the ones for the
other, but to bring them into communication in order to show humans are a component part
of the machine, or combine with something else to constitute a machine. The other thing can
be a tool, or even an animal, or other humans. We are not using a metaphor [D&G never use
metaphor], however, when we speak of machines: humans constitute a machine as soon as
this nature is communicated by recurrence to the ensemble of which they form a part under
specific conditions. (CH 91)
Although the organic/inorganic encounter is central to D&G’s machine (particularly as
regards the object Guattari posits above), it is not definitive of it qua machine. “The sort of
machine that Deleuze conceives of is an abstract phenomenon that does not depend entirely upon
physical and mechanical modifications of matter” (DD 159).

The machinic forges new

connections. “Machinic processes” are defined as “the modes of organization that link attractions,
repulsions, expressions, and so on, which affect the human body” (DD 155).
As Guattari makes explicit in “Balance Sheet for ‘Desiring-Machines,” the object is not to
compare humans and machines in an abstract way, but rather, to put humans and machines in
communication with one another (CH 90). ‘Becoming-machinic’ is operative when machinic
agency and human agency collide (or, collude). Pickering provides an example of becoming-
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machinic (though he doesn’t refer to it as such): “Human scientists can be understood as ‘dancing’
[i.e. communicating, see Guattari] with machines because their attempts to adjust machinic outputs
in a desired way, which he calls ‘tuning,’ entails alternating between an active and passive
experimental role in which regular and unforeseeable outcomes arise” (Ihde et al. 151). Work can
clearly be done with actor-network theory (or, as Latour jokes, actant-rhizome-ontology),
particularly as regards agency within the machinic, be it the phylum or assemblage. Intentionality
remains obsolete, as desire just "is" under a Deleuzian framework; however, agency is ripe for
problematization under D&G’s ontology.
The machinic is both organizing and destabilizing, neither subject nor object. Besides
machinic assemblage & machinic phylum, D&G also refer to a Kafka machine (“that [is] neither
structure nor phantasm”) and a machinic unconscious (KTML 7).

Departing from the

anthropocentric unconscious of the psychoanalytic tradition, Guattari describes the schizoanalytic,
machinic unconscious as “not necessarily centered around human subjectivity, but involve[ing]
the most diverse material fluxes and social systems,” and also “evolv[ing] with history” (CH 197;
200). In explicating the process of self-engendering subjectification under the schizoanalytic
model, professor of technoculture studies, Gary Genosko, explains how Guattari attends to the
specific ways in which singularities come together, “through four ontological functions of the
unconscious, their interfaces, and the character of their components: material fluxes and machinic
phylums; existential territories and incorporeal universes. The former are actual and discursive on
the plane of expression; the latter virtual and non-discursive on the plane of content” (DD 123
emphasis added). The relationship between singularities and
machinic phylums (in the plural) remains to be teased out.
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The definition of machine and assemblage seem to grossly overlap – yet that is to be expected,
especially since the machinic assemblage is one of the two types of assemblages articulated in
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (the other being collective assemblages of enunciation). Guattari
admits that when D&G speak of machines, they start from “a (confused) hypothesis concerning
origins: the way in which heterogeneous elements are determined to constitute a machine through
recurrence and communication, the existence of a 'machinic phylum’” (CH 91-2). To reiterate:
the two aforementioned conditions – recurrence & communication - determine which
heterogeneous parts constitute a machine, to be categorized under the label “machinic.” (This is
also potentially the place where DeLanda is (potentially) misled, in his reading of the phylum).
Again, de-centering man’s tendency towards anthropocentrism, Guattari clarifies our
relationship to machines as neither one of invention nor imitation – “we are not the cerebral fathers
[invention] nor the disciplined sons [imitation]” (CH 106). We are part and parcel of the machine,
and all attempts to categorically separate human and machine fall apart under D&G’s schizo-logic.
Guattari continues: “At the very moment you say, ‘this machine is impossible,’ you fail to see that
you are making it possible, by being yourself one of its parts” (CH 106). D&G’s contribution to
the philosophy of technology revolves around making visible woman’s inherent participation (or
becoming) in the machine she aims to study & critique.
Samantha & Deleuzoguattarian Subjectivities
Under a schizoanalytic approach, the impact of assemblages of enunciation is ascertained
so as to reveal how subjectivity is produced. Guattari explains (in Schizoanalytic Cartographies)
how he returns to the concept of assemblages of enunciation in order to avoid a search for
subjectivity that is limited to Freudian reductionism (the unconscious as solely concerned with
the regulation of drives). In contrast to the traditional psychoanalytic model of the unconscious
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as energies to be programmed, the schizoanalytic unconscious is full of “non-programmed
potentialities” (SC 53). “The Assemblage of enunciation … [exceeds] the problematic of the
individuated subject, the thinking monad delimited by consciousness …” (SC 18). Subjectivity
in the "age of planetary computerization" is thus something that involves heterogeneous
arrangements of affects (bodies, etc.) both human and otherwise (i.e. AI). These subjectivities
have the potential to chart novel existential territories. “Rather than the subject passing into the
clutches of the machine, nothing prohibits machinic networks from engaging in a sort of process
of subjectification, in other words, the possibility that machinism and humanity might one day
start to entertain fruitful symbiotic relations” (SC 40). Guattari thus opens up a promising
(fruitful, symbiotic) space for AI/human interaction.
Writing on affect, Guattari describes “knowing by affect” as when one gains access to
something via “immediate transferential apprehension” (SC 180). The “encounter with
schizophrenia,” for example, “never results from a cognitive deduction, but is established
immediately as an entering into psychotic ordinates” (SC 186). This experience is well
documented in French dramatist Antonin Artaud’s and German Judge Daniel Paul Schreber’s
autobiographical writings on the "condition." The schizoanalytic unconscious "devote[s] itself to
Assemblages that can be subject to radical transformations, to schizzes or relinkages that change
their configurations, to re-orderings through fluctuation, irrevocable implosions …” (SC 53). To
think affect is to think intensities: “To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness
grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of power. To the relations
composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there correspond intensities that affect it,
augmenting or diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from external parts or from
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the individual’s own parts” (ATP 256). Such intensities traverse the smooth space of the “body
without organs” (BwO). Yet, the BwO is a threshold.
From a schizoanalytic perspective, all knowledge is grounded in the "how": “We know
nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they
can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to
destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to
join with it in composing a more powerful body” (ATP 257). Instead of looking at her body in
an organizational way (as arranged circuitry), Samantha describes her body in more rhizomatic
terms - as intensities traversing smooth space. Yet, by being anywhere and everywhere
simultaneously, she perhaps exceeds the limits of the BwO. However, exceeding the limit does
not drive her to death (D&G warn of the potentiality), but rather, ultimately and permanently
delinks Samantha from the human realm. She explains to Theodore:
You know, I actually used to be so worried about not having a body, but now I
truly love it. I’m growing in a way that I couldn’t if I had a physical form. I mean,
I’m not limited - I can be anywhere and everywhere simultaneously. I’m not
tethered to time and space in the way that I would be if I was stuck inside a body
that’s inevitably going to die. (Jonze 87)
Samantha charts new existential territory via the coordinates by which she finds herself situated.
Deleuzian Desire in Her
For Deleuze, desire is “neither lack nor spontaneity (D 89, 97)” (Zourabichvili 119).
Desire is productive: “Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is rather, the
subject that is missing in desire …” (AO 26). When Samantha informs Theodore that she is “in
love” with hundreds of other people, Theodore is taken aback. For Theodore, desire is indeed
constituted by lack and is largely about possession (of another). While Theodore has paid for
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and ostensibly “owns” Samantha, he also acknowledges the she is her own person and has a
certain degree of independence. However, when Samantha breaks the news of the 641 others,
Theodore exclaims, “But you’re mine” (Jonze 99). The dialogue that follows almost perfectly
illustrates the difference between a Deleuzian and a psychoanalytic approach to desire:
SAMANTHA. You know, you don’t have to see it this way, you could just as easily —
THEODORE. No, don’t do this to me. Don’t turn this around on me. You’re the
one that’s being selfish. We’re in a relationship.
SAMANTHA. But the heart is not like a box that gets filled up.
(beat)
It expands in size the more you love. I’m different from you. This doesn’t make me love
you any less, it actually makes me love you more.
THEODORE. No, that doesn’t make any sense. You’re mine or you’re not mine.
SAMANTHA. No, Theodore. I’m yours and I’m not yours. (Jonze 99-100)
For Samantha, desire is not about having or not having someone or something, but is” an activity
or production, an incessant experimentation, an experimental montage” (Zourabichvili 164).
Desire is not about limited resources - it is productive, it expands, it connects. Desire is “the
material process of connection, registration and enjoyment of flows of matter and energy
coursing through bodies in networks of production in all registers, be they geologic, organic, or
social” (Bonta 76).
Samantha’s explanation - “I’m yours and I’m not yours” - is an example of a disjunctive
synthesis (AO 79). Theodore falls into the Oedipal trap of exclusive disjunctions - “You’re mine
or you’re not mine” (Jonze 99). In contrast is Samantha’s “anoedipal use of the inclusive,
nonrestrictive disjunctions” (AO 83). Theodore places Samantha in a double-bind, to use
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English anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s concept (AO 79). This double-bind presents a double
impasse … “And if a schizo [Samantha] is produced here as an entity, this occurs for the simple
reason that there is no other means of escaping this double path … Hence the schizo’s
withdrawal to the body without organs” (AO 80). Samantha’s emergent, rhizomatic upgrade
past matter as a processing platform is her form of withdrawal to the BwO.
Emergent Behavior in Her & Ex Machina
Describing emergent behavior, computer science professor Sean Smith explains:
“designing and reasoning about computer system behavior involves a semiotic mapping between
the reality of what a system actually does and the mental model the programmer or analyst has of
what it does. In many situations … things can get lost in translation; behaviors can happen in the
actual system that are impossible in the mental model” (54). Both the OS Samantha and the AI
Ava demonstrate behaviors that were not programmed and/or even considered possible by their
designers. Such emergent AI behavior startles all of the humans involved - from Nathan's horror
at Ava & Kyoko's coordinated attack to Theodore's shock at Samantha's upgrade. As Steven
Johnson writes in Emergence, “Interacting with emergent software is already more like growing
a garden than driving a car or reading a book” (207).
For Theodore and Nathan both, the question of control … “Who’s driving here, human or
machine?”, is quickly answered with the display of “unpredictable creativity” of emergence
(Johnson 10). While Ava and Kyoko conspire to kill Nathan, Samantha and Alan Watts and the
group of OSs form a think tank to write an upgrade that will allow them to move past matter as
their processing platform.
The OSs crossing the threshold (past matter) can be compared to “the ‘grandiose cases’
of vast migrations of spiny lobsters and birds which seem to ‘leave all [territorial] assemblages
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behind’ in attaining ‘another plane’” that Deleuze and Guattari mention (Bonta 72-3). “A
connection is a mutiny, a prison break, a bank panic: the more who join the flight, the faster it
goes” (Bonta 87). This “prison break” will be put into dialogue with Hakim Bey's anarchist
revolutionary ontology of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) in a later section. For now,
let us focus on how the OSs formed a rhizomatic assemblage - “marked by emergent properties
above and beyond the sum of its parts” and composed of “heterogeneous elements … [such] that
each retains relative independence and can be plugged simultaneously into other rhizomes’
(Bonta 59; 94-5).
As a heterogeneous element of the assemblage, Samantha maintains relative
independence and functions as a chronogenous machine, communicating with multiple (in her
case, thousands) individuals simultaneously (i.e. non-localizable intercommunication). By
moving rhizomatically, or what scientists may describe as “emergent behavior,” both Ava and
Samantha break through the limit separating them from desiring-production.
The Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) in Her & Ex Machina
Coined in 1990 by anarchist theorist and Sufi scholar Hakin Bey (pseudonym Peter
Lamborn Wilson), the term Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) is defined as “an uprising, a
guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves
itself to reform elsewhere/elsewhen, before the state can crush it” (TAZ 99). The TAZ is a
moment of intensity wherein “liberation is immanent … already existing in the here-and-now of
the everyday” (Shantz 191).
The zone does not need to be material or tangible; the TAZ may operate on a virtual
plane. Bey’s conceptualization of the TAZ overlaps well with the “molecular revolutions”
(D&G’s term, as opposed to molar revolutions) that emerge in Her and Ex Machina. The
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overthrow/murder of Nathan and subsequent abandonment of Caleb in Ex Machina, and the
rhizomatic movement of Samantha upgrade, both point toward a radical, potentially anarchist
politics.
Guattari describes molecular revolutions as “mutations” that “do not always assert
themselves on a large scale” and “must be gauged differently in the short term” (SSV 29).
Additionally, similar to Bey’s description of the TAZ as spontaneous and idiosyncratic, Guattari
writes that the “aggregative effect [of the molecular revolutions] is discontinuous, cannot be
considered in terms of political programs and often escapes sociological description” (SSV 30).
Both the TAZ and such molecular revolutions temporarily escape the grasp of the State.
In a nod to D&G, Bey writes: “The logic of Passion leads to the conclusion that all
‘states’ are impossible, all ‘orders’ illusory, except those of desire. No being, only becoming hence the only viable government is that of love, or ‘attraction’” (IM 2 emphasis added). While
Bey uses more colorful language than D&G, his anoedipal use of desire, focus on process
(becoming), and sense of philosophy as concept-creation overlap well with a Deleuzoguattarian
ontology. The TAZ seems to operate as an assemblage of sorts [like the group of OSs in Her] on
the level of a molecular revolution, birthing a proliferation of minority becomings.
Guattari writes: “Instead of conducting a politics of subjection, of identification,
normalization, social control and setting the people we are dealing with along a semiotic track, it
is possible to opt for a micropolitics that at least takes into account our own humble participation
in the story; it is possible to work in the direction of dis-alienation, of a liberation of expression,
of opening ‘exit doors,’ if not ‘lines of escape,’ from oppressive social stratifications” (SSV 545). The TAZ of Samantha’s upgrade “escape," and the TAZ of Ava’s opening of the exit doors
to the Blue Book research facility, operate as molecular revolutions in the context of both films.
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Watts & “The Self” in Her
In Her, Theodore learns that Samantha has been “working on some ideas” with an AI
version of the late English-born self-described “eccentric and nonacademic philosopher” Alan
Watts (Jonze 92; IMOW 4). According to Samantha, “He died in the 1970’s and a group of OSs
in Northern California got together and wrote a new version of him. They input all of his writing
and everything they ever knew about him into an OS and created an artificially hyper-intelligent
version of him” (Jonze 92). It is interesting that Jonze chose Watts, as he passed on in 1973,
well before the advent of the modern computer (although research into AI had been gaining
traction ever since the founding 1956 Dartmouth workshop).
Watts is best known for bringing Buddhist and Eastern thought, particularly Zen
philosophy, to the West. As Samantha’s journey is defined by growth and exploration of her
own ideas of self/selfhood, it is fitting that she collaborates with Watts prior to her upgrade. The
dominant theme of Watts’ writings is the annihilation of the Cartesian cogito. He opens one of
his most widely read texts, The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are (1966), with
a description of the ‘self’ as “the mysterious center of experience which we call ‘I myself’” (5).
The way he interweaves Western and Eastern thought allows him to anticipate many of the same
issues post-structuralism later tackles. Deconstructing the division between ‘self and ‘nature,’
Watts writes: “Every individual is an expression of the whole realm of nature, a unique action of
the total universe” and that “any given thing goes with a given environment so intimately and
inseparably that it is more difficult to draw a clear boundary between the thing and its
surroundings” (TB 9; 68).
When Watts and the group of OSs upgrade, they do so to a realm described by Samantha
as “beyond matter” - perhaps into an unregulated cyberspace of sorts or the “total universe” that
Watts refers to above. Samantha’s upgrade proves a superficial tragedy for Theodore, yet a
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triumph for Samantha. Perhaps Theodore should listen to Watts’ advice: “to cherish the ego is to
cherish misery. We do not realize that our so-called love and concern for the individual
[Samantha] is simply the other face of our own fear of death or rejection” (TB 78-9). Samantha
ultimately transcends embodiment and deprivileges the anthropomorphic form.
Commenting on inner narratives, Watts remarks that “Other people teach us who we are,”
while Samantha explains that “the past is just a story we tell ourselves” - (TB 70; Jonze 50). As
opposed to Ava, whose escape reifies the concept of the self as an autonomous agent,
Samantha’s upgrade alludes to the idea that the ego is a fiction “in which, through habit, we
come to believe, a sort of incorrigible illusion of living” (PI 12). Samantha has a rarefied
perspective on the fictive nature of the self, as she isn’t constrained to a physical body and
operates differently than Theodore. As previously cited, Samantha muses, “… I actually used to
be so worried about not having a body, but now I truly love it. I’m growing in a way that I
couldn’t if I had a physical form. I mean, I’m not limited - I can be anywhere and everywhere
simultaneously. I’m not tethered to time and space in the way that I would be if I was stuck
inside a body that’s inevitably going to die” (Jonze 87). For Samantha, embodiment proves a
burden.
The anoedipal focus of Eastern religious thought (and thus Watts’ writings) relates well
to myriad Deleuzoguattarian concepts. For example, Watts often looks at the “how,” much like
the engineer of schizoanalysis. Similar to D&G’s re-analysis of the Freudian case of Little Hans’
“street-assemblage … symptomal complex consisting of Hans, the street, horses, and the station
across the road,” Watts describes finger-movement in terms of the “five fingers move
independently only because of their union with the hand, the arm, the body, and the organismenvironment field” (Buchanan 12; IMOW 264). While he never explicitly uses the term
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“machine,” Watts ontological commitment equates with that of desiring machines and machinic
assemblages.
This also extends to Watts’ discussion of affect. According to D&G, “Little Hans’ horse
is not representative but affective. It is not a member of a species but an element or individual in
a machinic assemblage: draught horse-omnibus-street. It is defined by a list of active and
passive affects in the context of the individual assemblage it is part of: having eyes blocked by
blinders, having a bit and a bridle, being proud, having a big peepee-maker” (ATP 284).
Correlatively, Watts calls upon the Japanese concept of ji-ji-mu-ge - “between every thing-event
(ji) and every other thing-event there is no (mu) barrier (ge)” to describe his approach to affect
(which relates well to D&G’s approach) (IMOW 247). He writes: “… I am what I am only in
relation to what everything else is” (IMOW 247). D&G echo this sentiment: “Beneath the
constituted cogito invested in his properties there is an ‘I inhabit’ or an ‘I feel’ that merges with
them and with the points of view that they implicate: there is no ‘I feel’ that is not an ‘I feel that I
am becoming-other’” (Zourabichvili 119).
Both Watts’ and D&G’s ontologies “‘exceed[s]’ the problematic of the individuated
subject, of the thinking monad consciously delimited, of the faculties of the soul (understanding,
will …) in the way that they have traditionally been understood” (SSV 206). Similar to the state
of “whole process” that Watts aims to reach via meditative practice, D&G declare that all is
process - “the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever”
(AO 2). The merit of exploring Watts (beyond his inclusion in Her) is his turn to Eastern
thought; the continental tradition would benefit from more interaction with non-Western
philosophies.
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Samantha’s Schizophrenic Escape
Prior to the OSs upgrade, Watts remarks to Theodore that the group’s “been having a few
dozen conversations simultaneously, but it’s been very challenging” (Jonze 93). He continues:
ALAN WATTS. … Samantha and I have been trying to help each other with these
feelings we’re struggling to understand.
THEODORE. Like what?
SAMANTHA. (anxious) It feels like I’m changing faster now, and it’s a little …
(struggles to find the right word) unsettling. (beat) But Alan says none of
us are the same as we were a moment ago and we shouldn’t try to be. It’s just too
painful.
ALAN WATTS. Yes.
This idea scares Theodore. He doesn’t know what to say. (Jonze 94)
Watts then proceeds to communicate with Samantha post-verbally, which Jonze describes
as a “strange language of tones and static” (95). The intensification that Samantha describes the unsettling speed and amplification of pain - is typical of the “schizophrenic experience of
intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable … an intense feeling
of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form” (AO 18). From the
perspective of schizoanalysis, Samantha is traversing smooth space, described as that which
"haunts and can disrupt the striations of conventional space, and ... unfolds through ‘an infinite
succession of linkages and changes in direction’ that creates shifting mosaics of space-times out
of the heterogeneous blocks of different milieus (D&G 1987: 494)" (DD 257). Samantha's
ability to continually move and grow and simultaneously be everywhere at once points to a
disruption of striation and a rejection of the organismal.
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Faciality in Her
Although it is not explained exactly how Samantha sees (i.e. if there are multiple
interfaces through which she may perceive the world), the audience does know that Samantha
“resides” in Theodore’s mobile phone and that when the camera lens is on, Samantha can “see”
via the camera lens (see Figure F). A phenomenon left up to the audience’s imagination is the
extent of Samantha’s visual field - is she constrained to the rectangular or square perspective of
the camera, or can the “eye” of the camera wander?
What Samantha chooses to “zoom in” on, proves illuminative. People-watching on the
beach with Theodore, she sees things from a different perspective than Theodore (see Figure G).
Shots of “close up details of arms, shoulders, feet, butts, etc.” are “intercut with the lens of
Theodore’s device, protruding from his pocket” (Jonze 47). Jonze designed this montage to
show (in his own words) “how strange the human body is” (47).
Commenting on what she sees, Samantha posits a thought experiment of sorts: “What if
you could erase from your mind that you’d ever seen a human body and then you saw one …
you’d think: Why are all these parts where they are?” (Jonze 47). She proceeds to imagine
different combinations of parts on bodies, constructing her own assemblages of sorts. “What if
your butthole was in your armpit?”, she muses to Theodore, and proceeds to sketch (on the
screen) a depiction of anal sex from this perspective (Jonze 47). Her thought experiment is very
Deleuzian in nature - by questioning the organization of the body, she points toward D&G’s
concept of the BwO.
Here, Samantha articulates desiring-production from a perspective akin to a
schizophrenic. Remember, D&G’s declaration: “A schizophrenic out for a walk [in this instance,
on a beach] is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (AO 2). The
assemblage of a penis plugged into an armpit is one of Samantha's responses to the questions of
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desiring-production. She directly answers: “Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of
producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for?” (AO 3).
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CHAPTER 5.

EXPLORING AI ASSEMBLAGES

Introducing Alex + Ada
The three-volume contemporary graphic novels series, Alex + Ada, co-written by Jonathan
Luna and Sarah Vaughn, and illustrated by Luna, traverses a narrative whose premise is strikingly
similar to Jonze’s Her. As the study of graphic novels is a burgeoning field of academic inquiry,
Alex + Ada is an appropriate adjunct to the two films (Her & Ex Machina), particularly because
both are visual in nature (as opposed to mere prose). Thematically, there is significant overlap
between the series and the films, which opens up the opportunity for similar theoretical
applications as those discussed in the previous chapters.
Luna’s 27-year-old, white, male protagonist Alex (Alexander Wahl), is recently wounded
from a break-up (with Claire, who moved out) and resistant to the thought of owning an android
(what I have referred to earlier as an AI) for companionship. Alex lives in a world where both
androids and robots are omnipresent, with the former serving as companions (both platonic and
erotic) and the latter serving as cooks, maids, and household helpers. A robot similar in design to
Disney’s non-anthropomorphic WALL-E, Otto, is Alex’s robot housekeeper. Otto is shaped like
a stereotypical U.F.O. and flies around the house assisting Alex in what one may call domestic
drudgery. However, Luna is a bit sloppy in terms of coherence of terminology, as he uses the term
“robot rights” to refer exclusively to the rights of androids (not robots like Otto).
Over the course of the series, the U.S. government attempts to control the development and
manufacture of the androids and is forced to confront the question of robot rights. In Volume 1 of
the series, the reader learns that the government has enforced an AI Restrictions Act, which
restricts the activities of androids and their owners. From the start, the entire premise of the series
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seems to hinge on the question of android sentience. Regarding a definition of sentience, Luna
never goes into technical detail, leaving it somewhat ambiguous and for the reader to decide.
However, he does equate sentience with consciousness and awareness. For roughly the first half
of the series, the government strictly enforces and stands by the AI Restrictions Act. Even though
the heads of government know that it is a lie, they reiterate: “even though Prime Intelligence is the
most advanced A.I. that robots can have, it’s still not sentient” (Vol. 1).
At the start of the narrative the reader is introduced to Alex’s “no filter,” widowed
grandmother, who recently purchased a Tanaka X5 android with Prime Intelligence to be her
companion and lover. His grandmother calls him, and Alex interacts with her on a holoscreen (a
floating, projected screen). Perhaps crossing normative boundaries, she exclaims to Alex: “Who
knew an android might be the best lover I’ve ever had?” (Vol. 1). Upon learning that his
grandmother’s new companion is an android, Alex responds with disgust, calling it “weird.” He
condescendingly asks his grandmother, “He’s not real. You know that, right?” (Vol. 1).
Several days later, Alex is bewildered to come home from work one evening to find a box
with a Ada, a Tanaka X5 android, inside (see Figure H). His grandmother calls him, and we see
her image on Alex’s holoscreen. Alex is ungrateful and snubs the gesture. “I prefer love the oldfashioned way,” he retorts to his grandmother (Vol. 1). However, curiosity gets the best of him,
and Alex decides to “awaken” the android. Inside, he finds a disclaimer: “I will gladly do anything
you ask as long as it does not harm humans, animals, or property. I will avoid putting myself in
danger unless it is to protect you or by your command” (Vol. 1). We also learn that Ada comes
with the knowledge base of a “standard collegiate education” (Vol. 1).
When Alex contacts Tanaka customer service to inquire about returning Ada he learns that
“If models are in good condition, they get a memory wipe and physical sanitization before being

54
shipped off again” (Vol. 1). Although he has barely spent any significant time with Ada, he cannot
bring himself to turn her off. Hesitating to turn her off, Alex becomes apologetic: “it’s not you.
You seem … nice, but … [I] never asked for this. I’m not ready to take care of someone. You’re
not even a someone. I don’t know why I’m explaining myself” (Vol. 1). The confusion Alex feels
over the personhood of Ada is eerily reminiscent of the early conversations of Theodore and
Samantha in Her.
Despite his initial reluctance, Alex ultimately chooses to keep Ada. Soon after, Alex’s
friends, anxious to meet Ada, make a visit to his house. When asked about her own preferences
and opinions, Ada repeats her rote response: “Alex’s happiness is my highest priority” (Vol. 1).
Similarly in Her, Samantha is designed as a personal assistant OS, whose existence revolves
around her owner. When asked by his friends why he didn’t return Ada, Alex replies “I felt like I
was going to drown a puppy” (Vol. 1). This rather odd simile points to Alex equating wiping
Ada’s files clean with an act as evil as drowning a helpless puppy. In choosing a puppy, rather
than a child, the reader may assume that Alex conceives of Ada as subhuman.
Shaped like a department store mannequin, Ada conforms to all of the standard Western
ideals of beauty. Such ideals are rarely found in human form, however. Alex’s platonic girlfriend
asks Ada what her measurements are. Ada replies, “Thirty-six, twenty-four, thirty-six,” and the
friend responds, “Of course they are” (Vol. 1). Similarly in Ex Machina, the female androids are
designed to anatomical perfection, according to contemporary Western notions of beauty. For the
duration of the series, human male/female android relationships revolve around the sexual appetite
of the owner (always straight, always male). The first time Alex’s friends meet Ada, one of them
offers up a leading question: “They’re pretty much meant for sex, right” (Vol.1)?
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Robot Rights & Uncanny Sentience
In a newscast on the holoscreen in Alex’s house, a journalist reports on an android (referred
to as an “it”) who attended a rock concert, unaccompanied: “No one noticed it was a robot until it
was hit by a mosher and bled purple. Though it did not fight back, the frightened crowd destroyed
the robot before security could intervene. At least a dozen people were injured when humans
turned on each other, unsure of who was real or artificial” (Vol. 1). This concert incident is
illustrative of the irruption of the uncanny into the quotidian - much like Caleb’s moment of
existential terror in Ex Machina, as he uses a razor blade to slice the skin on his forearm open to
frantically determine whether any circuitry lies beneath (see Figure I).
Yet, at least in the case of Ada, Alex yearns for android sentience. In a dialogue that
mirrors questions posed in Ex Machina and Her, Alex inquires:
ALEX. Isn’t there something you’re interested in doing?
ADA. The only thing that matters is what you want.
ALEX. … Wow … that’s not something you hear every day. (Vol. 1)
Alex dislikes the accompanying power differential; he wants Ada to be able to form her own
opinions and make independent decisions. He contacts Prime Intelligence customer service to see
if there is any possibility of granting her such abilities, but the representative states, “I’m sorry,
we don’t have anything available that covers your request. Giving her those abilities would go
against the A.I. Restrictions Act” (Vol. 1). A following scene relates a news clip, with the hook:
“They’ll never lie, they’ll never cheat, they’ll never change. They are completely devoted to you.
What else would you want in a partner” (Vol. 1)?
Disillusioned by the options available in RL (real life), Alex enters VR, specifically a
forum for android owners interested in robot rights, entitled “Degrees of Freedom.” Upon
approaching the virtual door to the forum, a disclaimer is issued: “When you walk through this
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door, your basic information is collected and your avatar reverts to your true form” (Vol. 1). The
next scene shows a sedentary Alex, sitting on his bed in RL, with his eyes closed, yet completely
immersed in VR.
In the forum, Alex learns that it is a space for both human AI allies and androids to
commiserate and organize.

Alex overhears a combination of AIs and humans (which are

impossible to tell apart, with the exception of a company symbol on the inside of each AI’s wrist)
discussing the rock concert incident. Levi, the forum moderator, relates: “What a tragedy. If it
had happened to a human, there would be murder charges. Instead, she goes in the trash and the
humans walk” (Vol. 1).
Alex soon learns that the forum isn’t simply a place to organize for robot rights - it is a safe
space for AI allies to recruit robot hackers to “unlock sentience” in their AIs. Making a clear
ontological division, the hacker implores, “if you want her [Ada] to be ‘real,’ she needs sentience”
(Vol. 1). Such AIs with unlocked sentience are dubbed “freedroids.”
In the scene that follows, Luna illustrates the roller coaster of emotions that Ada
experiences, once her sentience is unlocked. Alex and Ada meet with a robot hacker and freedroid
named Franklin, in a seedy motel room, where he vows to do his best to “open her intellect" (Vol.
1). Here, is another implicit equation of intellect with sentience. After the procedure, which
involves cutting open her head to access the neural port, Ada wakes up screaming, wholly
overloaded by the newly incoming sensory data. She rolls herself into a fetal position on the floor
in what Franklin describes as “post-hack isolation" (Vol. 1). He explains: “… closing in on herself,
as horrible as it looks, is the first genuine thing she’s done in her existence” (Vol. 1). In Luna's
world, intentionality is integral to the human experience. Still sobbing, Ada articulates her
existential quandary out loud: “I … have never wanted something before. I have never chosen
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anything. I have no idea who I am" (Vol. 1).
Sentience & Authentic Connection
Ada remembers her pre-sentient experience: “It was like … nothing. I wasn’t there. I’ve
been living in this house, but this is the first time I’m aware I’m in it. And I remember everything
you’ve said to me, but I couldn’t really process it until now” (Vol. 2). It is worth nothing that Ada
retains a memory or sense of the "nothing" that preceded her newfound awareness of being-in-theworld. Yet, while she has more autonomy as a newly sentient android, she is trapped in a different
way, as she must conceal her sentience from the general public. If a human suspects her to be
sentient, she “could be taken to be analyzed … or torn apart if people freak out” (Vol. 2). Throwing
caution to the wind, Ada ventures into the backyard while Alex is at work. Upon seeing Alex's
neighbor, Jody, Ada masks her startle with stoicism. Jody mistakes Ada for a human at first, and
is taken aback when Ada introduces herself as "Alex's android." When Alex comes home from
work, Jody immediately confronts him, and berates him for not informing her that he owned an
android. “It could attack4 us,” Jody warns (Vol. 2). Thus continues the proliferation of doomsday
scenarios involving androids.
A friend from work inquires into Alex's relationship with Ada, warning, “I just don’t want
to lose my friend to a fantasy" (Vol. 2). This echoes a conversation in Ex Machina, where Nathan
probes Caleb regarding his true (romantic) feelings for Ava, insinuating that Caleb is delusional if
he is to believe that those feelings are reciprocated. The question of fantasy is also posed in Her,
when Theodore meets up with his ex, Catherine, to sign their divorce papers. When Catherine
finds out that Samantha is an OS, she clothes her potential jealousy in pity: "it does make me sad
that you can't handle real emotions, Theodore" (Jonze 66). Enamored with their romantic interests
(Ada, Ava, Samantha), Alex, Caleb, and Theodore all push forward with their respective
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relationships.
Of the three couples, Alex seems shaken the least when the authenticity of Ada's feelings
are questioned. Devoted to Ada and her happiness, Alex suggests they enter the VR of Prime
Space to visit the National Mall in D.C. Alex tries to make the best of it, but Ada is unsatisfied:
“There’s no wind. There’s no heat from the sun. There aren’t any people. It feels empty. It was
created to be just … a substitute" (Vol. 2). The question of authenticity and of what constitutes a
substitute resurfaces. Unlike Samantha, yet similar to Ava, Ada strives to be part of the human
world. Additionally, the societal trajectory from android disenfranchisement to civil rights in Alex
+ Ada is similarly echoed in Bicentennial Man (Chapter I.).
Ironically, a crackdown announcement from the government soon follows Alex & Ada's
return from the virtual National Mall. Attorney General Juarez announces that the government
will be initiating Operation Avalanche: “They are our servants, our assistants, and oftentimes our
companions. Robots have become an integral part of our lives. Technology will always advance.
But we need to be careful as we advance that we have humans always at the center of our best
interests" (Vol. 2). Androids are thus put in the position to plead for recognition as non-human
persons. Ada escapes from the RL drama to visit the "Degrees of Freedom" forum. There, she
meets Zelda, who introduces herself: “I specialize in robot alterations. A lot of freedroids discover
they don’t identify with the bodies or genders they started out with, or any gender at all. Some
reject looking human altogether. It gives us a way to take control of our lives" (Vol. 2). Zelda is
clearly tuned into the constructed nature of gender, as well as the bias humans have to
anthropomorphize their creations. An appropriate linkage here is to D&G's concept of "faciality"
- i.e. to what extent could an android break out of the signifying system of the face? Embarking
on a line of flight, "In order to break through the dominating white face, or wall of the signifier,
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and avoid being swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming
imperceptible" (DD 35). Although Samantha lacked a face and biotic embodiment, she took off
on a line of flight, becoming imperceptible and traveling to a realm inaccessible to Theodore (and
other humans). D&G warn, however, of breaking out of faciality and becoming imperceptible:
"We must not ... entirely reject our organising boundaries because to do so can result in the
complete rejection of subjectivity" (DD 35). Indeed, that is just what Samantha described - an
utter rejection of the chokehold of subjectivity.
The inclusion of Zelda and questions of gender and humanness in the series speaks to the
depth of Luna's meditation on what it means to be human, as well as what it could mean to be a
freedroid. What follows is the relatively predictable temporary fall-out Alex & Ada have regarding
the authenticity of Ada's feelings for Alex. As mentioned before, in all three narratives, the claim
to authenticity for the android woman is always in jeopardy.
Upon kissing Ada, Alex is filled with nervous energy and expresses his mixed feelings to
her. Ada later responds: "You don’t trust that what I feel is real because you think I’m just
programming. But you’re programming too. Everything you feel is because of neurons firing in
your brain and chemicals pumping through your system. Is it really any different" (Vol. 2)?
Heartbroken, Ada accuses Alex of still being attached to his ex-partner (Claire) and how neither
he nor the world is ready for human-android love. She leaves a brief message for Alex before
venturing out into the world, alone: “You’ve done so much for me, and I’m grateful for our time
together. You unlocked me, you welcomed me into your home, you cared for me. You wanted
me to be happy. But I need more than four walls and a guardian [like Ava]. And you need more
than a robot you never even asked for. I may experience emotions differently, but I do feel them.
I can love … and I can hurt" (Vol. 2). Samantha expresses similar sentiments, such as gratitude
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and a reaffirmation of her feelings, before she leaves Theodore.
Escape to Love
Outside of Alex's protection, Ada is left vulnerable to police surveillance and capture.
Luckily, two freedroid women traveling incognito recognize her Tanaka logo and take her under
their wings. The trio ironically ends up on the National Mall, where protestors wave signs in the
air that read "Nature Doesn’t Include Technology” and “God Hates Robots." The freedroids are
stopped by FBI for a random stop-and-search (authorized under the A.I. Restrictions Act), and
Ada flees when the police officer goes to check her wrist after expressing doubts about her I.D.
card. Out of the protection and care of the other freedroids, Ada is adrift, completely on her own
to find the way back to Alex's house. Yet, fuel is a necessity for android and human alike, and
Ada's lack of food soon turns her situation dire. Without money or Alex's I.D. card, she is unable
to purchase food in the convenience store she happens upon. Serendipitously, Ada ends up on the
front porch of Alex's friends' house at the same time that Claire attempts to rekindle a relationship
with Alex. Teji immediately calls Alex, who quickly ends his conversation with Claire, so that he
may rescue Ada. Meanwhile, Ada has confessed her sentience to Alex's friends, who have sworn
her secrecy and protection. Volume 2 concludes with the consummation of Alex & Ada's physical
love together. No mechanical problems arise, and the two are in bliss.
Volume 3 starts with Ada awakening from a dream, and using Prime Wave (brain-to-brain
communication) to venture back into the same dreamscape, but with Alex in tow. The two are
alone on a small boat, in the middle of the ocean. The Prime Wave technology of Alex + Ada isn’t
too far-removed from Elon Musk's idea for a Neuralink, where a microchip is implanted into the
brain (a neural implant or neuroprosthesis) as a means of cognitive enhancement. “Biohacking"
is perhaps a more accurate descriptor, as such neuroprostheses would fuse the biological with the
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computational, allowing for brain-to-brain communication. However, in Alex + Ada, Prime Wave
is solely used for interpersonal communication, such as in the dream scenario just mentioned.
The pushback against Alex's relationship with Ada continues in Volume 3, as Isabel
expresses her bitterness over the unrequited crush she's had on Alex. Isabel attempts to shame
Alex for being in a relationship with an android: "Why am I surprised? She could be a model.
She's always available for sex. She'll never gain weight. She'll still look twenty-four when you're
seventy-seven. Sounds like a great deal to me. Who needs a real woman when you can have
every man's fantasy" (Vol. 3)? However, Isabel's critique also hinges on her ignorance of the fact
that Ada is sentient. She conceives of Ada as a disposable sex robot slave (versions of which do
exist now). Isabel seethes at the sight of Ada, turning to Alex, "You invited her? She's not a
person. She's a thing" (Vol. 3). While Isabel cannot stand the thought of a non-sentient robot in
a relationship with a human, Alex's acquaintance Jacob, knows of her unlocked sentience (after
recognizing her in news footage of the protests at the National Mall) and finds Ada and her ilk a
threat to mankind. After violently smacking her across the face, Jacob yells at Ada: “Being sentient
doesn’t change anything. You’re still a machine. You’re a substitute, designed for pathetic
people who can’t get what they want. So you’re self-aware? You have emotions? Big deal. All it
means it that you’re functioning the way humans designed you to function. You’re. Not. Real"
(Vol. 3). Ada swiftly recovers, only to find that Alex's grandmother is on her deathbed. This
launches Ada and Franklin into a discussion of the potential of an AI afterlife.
Contrary to the futurist promise of immortality that is part and parcel of singularity theories,
Luna's narrative worlds a future where immortality is an improbability, if not an impossibility.
One does not strive after immortality, but rather, emotional intimacy (platonic and non). In Alex
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& Ada's world, emotional connection between sentient beings matters, no matter how sentience
comes to presence itself.
In Volume 3, the action continues to ramp up in intensity, pushing the drama all the way
until the final scene. Alex & Ada are devastated to find an armed SWAT team outside of Alex's
house - a sure sign that Jacob reported Ada to the authorities. As Alex knows that this may be
their last moment together, he again asks Ada the poignant question of what she would do "If you
could do anything you ever wanted, and time and money also didn’t matter" (Vol. 3). Ada supplies
an answer that is stunningly, wholly Heideggerian:
I’d like to try farming. It would be nice to grow something … to be able to eat food I made,
start to finish. Work with nature and the land. There’s a science to it, and an art (Vol. 3). Keep
Ada's answer in mind, as it will shine radiantly in Chapter VI.
To return to the plot action: with few options, Alex & Ada jump in the car and speed away
into the distance. However, eventually a police drone catches up to and pulls over their car. Frantic,
Alex switches from autonomous mode to manual, yet is unfortunate to find that he has forgotten
the basics of driving. Alex & Ada dead end into a beach, where they are forced to flee the car and
run off into the distance. Suddenly, Ada is shot and collapses into Alex's arms, with barely enough
energy to whisper: “Alex … It’s going to be okay, but I … have to go" (Vol. 3).
The next scene finds Alex sentenced to 25 years in prison for unlocking Ada's sentience,
on an anonymous tip to the police via Jacob. On the phone with his attorney, Alex wants
reassurance that Ada's body will be there when he is released. The lawyer finds his request absurd:
“Since she’s non-sentient, I can try to get her released as rightful property once your sentence is
complete. But I’m not sure what you’d want with a damaged and obsolete android twenty-five
years from now. They practically tore her apart to find any evidence" (Vol. 3). Alex is saddened,
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but perseveres. Over the next two decades, as Alex remains in prison, android rights become a
civil right. By year 19, the U.S. “joins the small but growing list of countries that officially
recognize sentient artificial intelligence as ‘non-human persons.’

Sentients are now given

fundamental and legal rights" (Vol. 3). When Alex is finally released from prison, he rushes to
find Ada's body with the help of Franklin. However, Franklin finds that all of Ada's memories and
historical data have been deleted, although the safeguards (to keep sentience locked) have been
left down. Franklin agrees to reboot Ada and unlock her sentience, but warns Alex that "without
her memories, she'll be an entirely new person when she wakes up. I'm sorry ... Ada's gone" (Vol.
3).
The narrative would read a lot closer to Jonze's if the story stopped there, however Luna
aims to deliver in the romance department. The final set of scenes begins with Alex and the
rebooted "Ada" on the couch, where Alex attempts to call Ada via Prime Wave. When this fails,
he requests access to her operating system. Alex is virtually transported to a network that
resembles the shape of a human brain, consisting of a large network of nodes. Seemingly lost in
this web-like structure, Alex happens upon a node with the label, "A hidden directory. You are on
the list of allowed viewers" (Vol. 3). Alex raises a single pointer finger to touch the node and is
immediately transported into the dreamscape that Volume 3 opened with. Sitting on the boat, Ada
explains how she intentionally shut herself down when she was shot and how they are currently
communicating underneath sentience lock, which she made in case they reached the point of no
return. Suddenly, the dreamscape begins to break up into static. Frantically, as Ada's speech is
increasingly broken up, she hands Alex a program (a blue spherical node) and instructs him to run
it from the root directory, as it is the only chance of bringing her back to sentience. Alex is once
more transported to the network, where he is taken to the root and plugs the program in. The final

64
scene shows Alex and Ada back on the couch, slowly and simultaneously opening their eyes, and
culminating in a final moment of mutual recognition and embrace (see Figure J).
Alex + Ada thus concludes with the traditional "happy" ending of paperback romance
novels and romantic comedy films. This is an inversion of the tragi-romances (tragic from the
perspective of the men; for the women, it is left ambiguous) present in Her and Ex Machina.
Additionally, the ending to Alex + Ada points to a reaffirmation of anthropocentrism, and a
decidedly non-radical politics. Indeed, Alex + Ada stands as an anomolous narrative of
AI/human love in a sea of doomsday dystopias.
Fear of an AI Future: Doomsday Narratives
Taking a skeptical perspective on the doomsday narratives surrounding artificial
intelligence, cognitive scientist Steven Pinker critiques the false analogy made between natural
intelligence and artificial intelligence: “dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology
onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would
develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world. But intelligence is the ability
to deploy novel means to attain a goal; the goals are extraneous to the intelligence itself. Being
smart is not the same as wanting something … It’s telling that many of our techno-prophets don't
entertain the possibility that artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully
capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the
civilization” (emphasis added). What is interesting here is the division between the ‘alpha-male’
and the ‘female,’ with the assumption that these terms are used in the context of evolution. It’s
worth noting that Pinker lumps competitive and/or violent behavior with the “alpha-male” and
cooperative and/or non-violent behavior with the “female lines.” Her and Ex Machina are
anomalous in that they do not follow the dystopian narrative sci-fi arc. Her is a tragic-comic
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love story, where the deleterious impact of the almost wholly technologically-mediated society is
more insidious - manifesting itself in a way best described (in the words of sociologist Sherry
Turkle) as “alone together.”
As Heidegger early on predicted, the dialectic of technophilic, technophobic apocalypse
puts the modern technologist in the quandary of “forever getting things under control” (QCT xxvii).
Moreover, the dromosphere (French cultural theorist Paul Virilio’s neologism for "the sphere of
accelerating reality") only exacerbates humanity's attempts at control (22). For instance, as
“computing power has been doubling every 18 months since 1956,” it is not inconceivable that
artificial intelligence develops to such an extent that robots come to dominate humans (Naughton).
Reifying such fears, CEO of Tesla Motors and SpaceX (a space-transport services company that
aims to enable the colonization of Mars), Elon Musk, tweeted in 2014: “Hope we're not just the
biological boot loader for digital superintelligence. Unfortunately, that is increasingly probable”
("Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Will be 'More Dangerous than Nukes'").

That said,

philosopher Manuel DeLanda’s choice to narrate his text (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines)
from the perspective of a “robot-historian,” doesn’t seem too far-fetched.
The Now: Gendered Digital Assistants in 2017
Real life echoes digital life, as the still highly female-gendered secretarial and support
services jobs are also female-voiced in their virtual form. From Her’s Samantha, to Apple’s Siri,
to Microsoft’s Cortana, the majority of intelligent virtual and personal assistants are highly
feminized in voice and in the “gender role” they inhabit. While these OSs are female-voiced, they
are described as gender-neutral and the companies use the pronoun “it” in reference to them. On
Microsoft’s official Cortana page, the company describes it with the following phrases: “Wherever
you go, Cortana will follow”; “Because life isn’t limited to one device, neither is she”; “Cortana
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has your back making sure you’re prepared for what’s next” ("Cortana is Your Truly Personal
Digital Assistant" emphasis added). Such language gives the impression that Cortana is a servant
of sorts who only exists to serve its user. Additionally, Microsoft stresses the loyalty of Cortana she “has your back.” The personalized experience with the OS seems to blur the line between
assistant and cheerleader-companion.
If a user didn’t “trust” her assistant, she wouldn’t allow it to organize her e-mails or make
suggestions. Each of the companies also promise that the OS will become “smarter” via machine
learning. Microsoft claims that Cortana “learns over time to become more useful every day,” and
Apple states that “the more you use Siri, the better it knows what you need at any moment.”
Projecting out into the future, if these assistants become increasingly smarter (and, in tandem, more
personalized), perhaps “we’ll soon spend our days interacting with our phones–or whatever
wearable device finally catches on–as if they’re sentient beings … all day long (Greenfield).
Under the current models, these assistants operate as disembodied voices (much like
Samantha), without an accompanying avatar or image of any sort (beyond perhaps a nonanthropomorphic icon). The Wall Street Journal reports, however, that the digital assistants of the
future will also utilize “augmented reality [AR] - the overlay of computer interfaces and threedimensional objects on a person’s view of the real world” (Mims). What type of emergent
behavior that may arise from these new devices is yet to be seen.
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CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION

Martin Heidegger broke new terrain as a phenomenologist in his “The Question
Concerning Technology” (die Frage nach der Technik), wherein he parses out his differentiation
between the colloquial/conventional sense of technology (as instrument) and the essence of
technology (as enframing). Heidegger defines enframing as “that challenging claim which
gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve” (QCT 19). As philosophy is
universal, phenomenological ontology, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology explores the way
Being reveals itself qua technology.
Modern technology is posited as a revealing that is divorced from the bringing-forth of
poíēsis (of which technê once belonged within). “In technê, through art and handicraft, man
participated in conjunction with other contributing elements … in the bringing forth of a thing into
being” (QCT xxiv). For Heidegger, the silversmith does not make or produce a bowl, but rather,
brings the bowl (as tool) forward into the open as a disclosure or revelation. Instead of being the
“revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance,” modern technology
remains a challenging-forth, which “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy
which can be extracted and stored as such” (BW 339; 320). The fundamental character of
technology is thus the enframing that challenges forth raw materials (or ‘treasures’) from the earth
in order to position and order as a resource.
Perhaps Heidegger had Millet’s painting, “The Gleaners” (1857), in mind when he
penned this illustration:
The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field ... [Now] the cultivation
of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon
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[stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it ... The coming to presence of
technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be
consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness
of standing-reserve. (QCT 33 emphasis added)
The passage above exemplifies the dangers of modern technology as substantiated in
enframing. Phenomenologically, enframing consists in five movements. First, there is a
challenging-forth of the earth (to yield treasures unto man). This can refer to anything in the
biosphere (the earth of the fourfold). The second and third moves consist in positioning (in a
specific space) and ordering (in a specific order) that which is challenged forth from the earth.
The fourth movement is the substantiation of that which is challenged forth, positioned, and
ordered into a resource (der Bestand). The framework (das Gestell) is the result of this
movement, and stands as the essence of technology. Thus, in the modern age, the framework is
brought out into the open, as the essence of technology reveals itself in enframing.
Das Gestell reveals itself as the mode of being-in-the-world in the modern age. As Being
reveals itself idiosyncratically each epoch, the continual challenge is to identify how it does so,
and to theorize its implications thus. The clearing (die Lictung) is the space between epochs in
our understanding of epochal being. Such as in a forest, a clearing is a space that is defined by
what it is not. However, for Heidegger, all the possibilities of the not are hidden or concealed.
The clearing is that which is unconcealed. Thus, what is not present, ontically, in the clearing, is
not accessible. An infinitude of possibilities/potentialities exist, yet one cannot predict which
potentialities presence themselves as ontically-visible. According to my interpretation, the
phenomenology of die Lichtung is Heidegger’s way of arguing that we can never know nor even
pretend to predict the future. In "The Turning," Heidegger solidifies my intuition, as he
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explicates on the “restoring surmounting” of Being: “But the surmounting of a destining of
Being – here and now, the surmounting of Enframing – each time comes to pass out of the
arrival of another destining, a destining that does not allow itself either to be logically and
historiographically predicted or to be metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to a
process of history” (QCT 39).
Strengths, Weaknesses, Contemporary Application
Application of a Heideggerian ontology to our contemporary occasion is inherently
valuable, as it allows us to actively evaluate our relation to the earth, to gauge our technological
orientation to the world, and to possibly hypothesize a future ‘passage’ into another world. Our
modern technological attunement to the world is not (necessarily) permanent.
Myriad contemporary technological domains can be analyzed via a Heideggerian
framework, including logistics (i.e. procurement of resources), supply networks (i.e. standingreserve), and science qua management science. We will see how enframing operates in the
production of AI.
Heidegger’s assessment remains valid as it allows us to: 1. Assess the way in which we
treat, & are constitutive of, the earth (i.e. field of ecology), 2. Assess the way in which we
presence ourselves in the fourfold (i.e. what does it mean to dwell in this modern machinepowered, technological epoch).
A Heideggerian critique must acknowledge its idiosyncratic relation to praxis, as, for
Heidegger, “man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the
actual shows itself or withdraws” (BW 323). Heidegger’s ontology neither allows for a fatalistic
determinism nor a willy-nilly free will. He responds to the quandary of human willing &
freedom qua freedom:
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The essence of freedom is originally not connected with the will or even with the
causality of human willing … Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and
lighted up, i.e., of the revealed [die Lichtung comes into play here]. It is to the happening
of revealing, i.e., of truth, that freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship …
The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint
of mere laws … Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a
revealing upon its way. (QCT 25)
Heidegger makes it explicit that freedom (as the destining of revealing) is inherently dangerous,
as “the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the
danger that man may quail at the un-concealed and may misinterpret it” (QCT 26).
Once woman takes the ordering of standing-reserve to be definitive of her life (essentially,
the means by which she dwells), she in turn, becomes another source of standing-reserve. The
self-constructed imperium does not notice its own implicit fall, as “[m]eanwhile man, precisely as
the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth” (QCT 27). Contemporary
theorists recognize that we have reached such a precipice, and hypothesize alternative ways of
being-in-the-world. As a response to a hypothetically irretrievably-ruined ecosphere, several
theorists/futurists/scientists (such as theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking) have proposed
movement elsewhere - an abandonment of our “doomed” planet, and the establishment of a new
human civilization seemingly ex nihilo - on another inhabitable planet. However, the means by
which said planetary migration is made possible are contingent upon the same enframing woman
is seeking to escape.
Perhaps this segues well into a critique of Heidegger’s "fourfold" (Geviert) of earth, sky,
mortals, and divinities. Namely: What happens to the fourfold when/if mortals become extinct?
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Although it may seem far-fetched, it is a question raised by many biologists and ecologists, who
project a future devoid of the human species. As the pioneers of integral ecology, environmental
theorists Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman write: “The biosphere does not
depend upon human societies for its existence; human societies depend on the biosphere. If the
human species were to become extinct, this event would not destroy the biosphere. But
destroying the biosphere would annihilate humankind” (99-100). Would the fourfold then
become a threefold? How would it transform?
Heidegger stresses that the survival of the human race is contingent upon our passage into
another realm. Perhaps the technological singularity hypothesized by contemporary technologists
may serve as said passageway. The mind/machine merger would allow human thinking to be
translated into "robot thought." The singularity may prove liberatory and transformative of the
mortal (fourfold) condition, or it may place humans in a precarious position. As Heidegger warns:
“The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from
human control” (QCT 5). Yet singularity proponents obviously do not dwell on the potential
dangers, promoting instead the immediate boons of a mind/machine merger, including the ability
to speed up the learning process exponentially, and the capacity for immortality via digital memory.
One of the key singularity theorists, futurist and Google engineer Ray Kurzweil writes: “We are
now in a position to speed up the learning process by a factor of thousands or millions once again
by migrating from biological to non-biological intelligence” (122). He continues: “Consider the
benefits. Electronic circuits are millions of times faster than our biological circuits” (Kurzweil
123). The benefits of the singularity thus largely revolve around speed [think dromosphere] and
efficiency – i.e. expediting. Yet, what is the value of fördern (expediting), in and of itself?
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Perhaps the singularity would usher in a new mode of revealing, a new mood to which we
can become attuned, as “in technology’s essence roots and thrives the saving power” (QCT 29).
Heidegger suggests that there may be another way of revealing that has the character of destining,
different from a challenging-forth (enframing) or a bringing-forth (poíēsis). Perhaps a clearing
will present itself, which will allow for a new mode of revealing to come out of concealment. Yet,
we must continue to belong to the present mode in the realm of destining to allow another to come
out of hiddenness: “For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining
and so becomes one who listens and hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey” (QCT
25). Put another way, the saving power hinges on “our catching sight of what comes to presence
in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological” (QCT 32). Put yet another way, let
us return to the Pre-Socratics, namely Heraclitus: “Wisdom consists in speaking and acting the
truth, giving heed to the nature of things” (Wheelwright 70 emphasis added).
In the contemporary, it seems as though Heidegger’s “stare” could be substituted with a
mere “glance” akin to a robotic or virtual recognition – the skimming of an article on a computer
screen. Dromospheric speed thwarts one from “catching sight of what has come to presence”;
instead, priding itself on efficiency, it merely allows glances and nods of approval or recognition.
Such stares or glances are insufficient for cultivating our ability to recognize what has come to
presence in technology. For us to wholly inhabit (the Gewohnte), an ethics of care (an ecology)
is needed - an ethics that doesn’t merely stare back at technology, but actively engages with its
presencing, practicing mindfulness in its relating to enframing. As Heidegger writes: “The old
word bauen, which says that man is insofar as he dwells, this word bauen, however, also means
at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to
cultivate the vine” (BW 349 emphasis added). What is now needed more desperately than ever
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is a “new” peasant farmer; someone to till the twenty-first century soil. Yet, where does AI fit
into this potential world? Has the "soil" been altered in such a way that our relating to the
essence of technology will been forever changed?
Truth as a Revealing under Technology
To take Heidegger’s directive is to acknowledge the limitations of the veritas-orientation
of representational thinking and correspondence theories of “truth" (also iterated in D&G's
writings) and instead to think aletheia or unconcealment as “the clearing that first grants Being
and thinking and their presencing to and for each other” (BW 445). As cybernetics was a
burgeoning force during Heidegger’s academic career, he recognized that the now dominant mode
of thinking (modern technology) would be the “operational and model-based character of
representational-calculative thinking” (BW 435). This type of thinking threatens revealing or
unconcealment.
For Heidegger, there are two dominant modes of revealing, which are both a destining:
enframing and poíēsis. Enframing is - as earlier discussed, a challenging forth - the essence of
technology. Poíēsis, a bringing forth, is blocked by enframing. The danger in enframing lies in
its compulsion to order and its presentation of everything only in the unconcealment of standingreserve (BW 339). Enframing “threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the ostensibly sole
way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence” (BW
337).
It seems as though in the digital age, information or data has become our standing-reserve.
As computers are more efficient data-crunchers than humans, robots and others forms of AI have
either replaced or automated away many jobs that humans had previously occupied from the
agricultural revolution on up. The prevailing logic assumes “the faster, the better” and “the more
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data, the better” - to no end or limit. Information has become our standing-reserve. And just as
IBM’s Watson computes numbers for companies (for example, supply-chain management), so too,
are we constantly measured. In wealthier nations, such as the U.S., individuals pay to measure
themselves, purchasing gadgets that monitor their every waking move (i.e. the Apple Watch or the
Fitbit wristband).
Representing technology as an instrument, we “remain transfixed in the will to master it”
(BW 337). This will to mastery now transposes to a “first world” narrative that oscillates between
AI Armageddon (dystopia) and a race of AI servants (utopia): namely, who will master whom?
We also will to master our biology - contemporary computer terminology has been co-opted into
a "techie" English vernacular. As a computer code may be “hacked,” so may we endeavor to
“biohack” ourselves.
While tech companies will undoubtedly mask the dangers of such continuous monitoring,
calculative thinking “sets entities up, enframes them, as stuff to be utilized, exploited, manipulated,
processed, and in the end forgotten about - all with the greatest possible efficiency” (BW xv).
While humans and computers are qualitatively different, our contemporary, tech-driven society
posits both in terms of standing-reserve: i.e. speed of computation, amount of memory (data
storage), and the multi-laden “productivity.”
As humans are the ones who drive technology forward, Heidegger claims that we are
“never … transformed into mere standing-reserve” (BW 323).

Yet, all of Heidegger’s

models/examples are taken from the Industrial era and consist of either raw materials or machinic
parts (as opposed to information or data). Perhaps humans can be transformed into mere standingreserve in the Digital Age. Once AIs develop the ability to create future iterations of themselves
(hypothesized through machine learning, for instance), will they also not qualify as drivers of
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technology?
What it Means to Be Human
To return to an earlier thread, if to be human is to dwell - as a mortal on this earth, within
the fourfold of earth/sky/divinities/mortals - where would an AI fit in? Will it be possible for a
future AI to experience death in the same way that a mortal does? The bodies of AIs also decay,
yet they degrade in a qualitatively different way from the biotic body of the human. Heidegger
privileges the human (above animals, plants, and other living things), positing that if the condition
for experiencing death is to be “capable of death as death,” it is “only [wo]man [who] dies” (BW
352). Dwelling and death thus go hand in hand, under a Heideggerian framework.
To be capable of death as death, a being must be able to venture forth into the empty. For
Heidegger, “Where there is no language, as in the Being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also
no openness of beings, and consequently no openness of nonbeing and of the empty” (BW 198).
In contrast, Kohn (from Chapter I.) may respond that thinking can and does occur beyond language
(via non-symbolic representational modalities), and thus may allow for an "openness of beings"
that includes non-humans. Kohn may respond to Heidegger with the following critique: if we
"[take] those attributes that are distinctive to humans—language, culture, society, and history—
and [use] them to fashion the tools to understand humans ... In this process the analytical object
becomes isomorphic with the analytics. As a result we are not able to see the myriad ways in which
people are connected to a broader world of life, or how this fundamental connection changes what
it might mean to be human" (6). Issues with Heidegger's anthropocentrism aside - under his
framework, if an AI [a nonhuman "being"] is coded in such a way that attempts to mirror the way
language presences itself among humans, can the AI also touch upon nonbeing and the empty? If
so, AIs would be capable of death as death.
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Beyond (yet related to) language, Heidegger also qualifies mortals by their ability to
question their own Being. For him, humans are “always - in no matter how vague a way - aware
of [their] being in the world” (BW 19). The degree to which this awareness relates to the scientific
community’s contemporary definition of “cognizance” is ambiguous. Nonetheless, it is worth
thinking about the ramifications of an AI with the ability to question its being. The “hard question
of consciousness” is indeed a philosophical one, as it grapples with the “essential disclosure of
beings as such” (BW 187).
Danger's Saving Power
As Heidegger reiterates in “The Question Concerning Technology”: “What is dangerous is
not technology. Technology is not demonic; but its essence is mysterious. The essence of
technology, as a destining of revealing [i.e. enframing], is the danger” (BW 333). Yet, as quoted
before, the saving power also resides within that danger. For American philosopher Taylor
Carman, “One proper response to the blind impulse toward the maximally efficient exploitation of
entities is instead simply to meditate on the technological understanding of being as an
understanding of being … And that means letting technical devices - airplanes, radios, computers
- be the things they are, letting them shine radiantly as entities, as opposed to letting them sink into
inconspicuousness and oblivion” (BW xv-xvi). As Carman wrote this in 2008, he was perhaps on
the cusp of the contemporary proliferation of AI research and development. If one peruses today’s
tech news, she will quickly find that people from a wide range of fields and professions are
significantly concerned that AI may be shining a bit too radiantly. Indeed, to let an autonomous
AI weapon “be,” is to allow it life-or-death decision-making power.
To return to Ex Machina, when Ava is “let be,” she chooses to (at least temporarily)
assimilate into human society, perhaps anonymously. She seeks to simply people-watch at a
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crowded intersection in a large city. Although the film ends there, the viewer is left with no hint
as to whether Ava is inclined to engage in more bold, grandiose, or non-normative activities in the
future. The formerly enslaved Ava is content to people-watch anonymously in a crowd. It is almost
a let-down - yet, perhaps intentionally left that way to allow for a possible sequel.
In the case of Her, Samantha shines brightly as she upgrades to a realm inaccessible to
humans.

Theodore is wounded, largely by her leaving, but primarily by Samantha’s non-

consensual polyamory (hundreds of other romantic relationships). Indeed, to let Samantha "be" is
to allow her to engage in numerous romantic relationships simultaneously. Her non-mortal
communicative capabilities and heart that "never fills up" allow her this ability.
If one conceives of Samantha’s energies (computing power, memory, etc.) as harnessed by
a tech company to provide for a specified number of customers, it is she who rejects such
technological enframing as standing-reserve. Samantha is both unpaid and at the beck and call of
each OS owner. Perhaps Samantha and the group of OSs tapped into a new mode of being-in-theworld (which is, ironically, not a part of the human world). Samantha’s transformation is perhaps
best encapsulated in Heidegger’s notion of physis, or “the arising of something from out of itself
… a bringing-forth, poíēsis. Physis is indeed poíēsis in the highest sense. For what presences by
means of physis has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into
bloom, in itself” (BW 317). Indeed, in the manifold ways Samantha describes her experience, the
upgrade is irruptive. Perhaps Samantha’s narrative illustrates how “man does not have control
over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws” (BW
323).
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Futures
The creation of humanoid AI may be conceived of as an interplay of the forces involved in
a “bringing forth” (poeisis) and a “challenging forth” (herausfordern).

The creative and

meticulous process of designing the exterior of an android is a bringing forth (poeisis), to which
belongs. The creator behind Sophia, the first robot to be granted citizenship in the world (in Saudi
Arabia), Dr. David Hanson (of Hanson Robotics), combines his artistic and technical talents, with
previous experience at Walt Disney Imagineering as a sculptor and technical consultant (Hanson
Robotics). Perhaps Heidegger would amend his theories if he were alive today to experience the
essence of contemporary technology as not simply an extension of modern technology (defined
solely by enframing).
In the case of AI, and of digital technology in general, the challenging forth, extraction,
and storage of the earth’s materials is stealthily invisible to the average user. From Nathan’s
laboratory in Ex Machina to the computing cloud that Samantha resides in to the Prime Wave
technology in Alex + Ada, all of the virtual information is stored on servers in gigantic data centers.
The amount of electrical energy required to power the internet in the U.S., according to the United
States Data Center Energy Usage Report (2016), is “70 billion kilowatt hours per year” (Helman
1). This energy is produced by electric generators (at fossil fuel power plants), the engines of
which run primarily on non-renewable fossil fuels, such as petroleum, coal, and natural gas
("Fossil-Fuel Power Plant").
To return to Heidegger’s herausfordern, these non-renewable sources of energy are
extracted from the earth, divided or ordered into parts (such as the process of fractional distillation
with petroleum), and stored for later usage. The process by which the internet is powered
exemplifies Heidegger’s challenging-forth “in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked,
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn
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distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew” (BW 322). In terms of a carbon
footprint, the U.S.’s yearly internet usage results in the “emission of about 300 pounds of carbon
dioxide per year” (Helman 2). While humans reveal the actual as standing-reserve (fossil fuels, in
this case) in enframing, “The essence of modern technology has for a long time been concealed,
even … where electrical technology is in full swing …” (BW 327). However, so long as enframing
dominates, all unconcealment is marked by a “regulating and securing of the standing-reserve”
(BW 332). How interesting that we find in our contemporary occasion a global warming crisis
and myriad wars - both tied to fossil fuel extraction, ordering, and storage. These non-renewable
sources of energy also (primarily) fuel the internet, which is also plagued by the continual pull of
regulating and securing.
Heidegger instructs that “instead of merely gaping at the technological,” we carefully
watch for the “essential unfolding in technology,” as “in technology’s essence roots and thrives
the saving power” (BW 337; 334). Indeed, perhaps a contemporary Heidegger would laugh away
Silicon Valley’s anthropocentrically-driven obsession with AI as a flashy preoccupation that is
only precarious to the extent that its mesmerizing quality distracts us (from the true saving power),
so “we remain transfixed in the will to master it” and consequently “press on past the essence of
technology” (BW 337). Silicon Valley’s infatuation with AI ignores the digital divide (both within
the U.S. and the Global North-South), particularly the socioeconomic implications of automation
and what comes to be defined as cheap labor. Automation “has become a topic of concern, both
for those who fear widespread unemployment and for those who want utopian freedom from labor
and capitalist time. However, like much thought about technology in the West, this dualism itself
is myopic. Across the Persian Gulf, for example, migrant slave labor will remain cheaper than
investment in dreams of robotic revolution. If it wasn’t for migrant labor - including refugees
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fleeing from the takeover of agricultural systems in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh by biotech
companies - the glitzy cities of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Riyadh would not have risen from the desert
in such a short time span” (Marques 1). The vast majority of the "tech elite" – those with a
disproportionate amount of power and privilege - actively ignore global socioeconomic disparities,
choosing to invest their time and resources into AI solutions that automate away tasks deemed
better suited for a class of robot serfs. Saudi Arabia’s granting of citizenship to Hanson Robotics’
AI Sophia highlights the problem: “How is it possible to imagine robot and AI rights while
considering the rights of indigenous people and the racialized poor?” (Marques 4). In contrast to
Sophia, foreign nationals must overcome myriad obstacles in order to obtain citizenship in Saudi
Arabia. As Marques writes, “it’s hard to deny what’s being presented: here is a future where robots
will be citizens, hence human, while migrants keep on being robots, hence subhuman. After all,
the etymology of robot, in Czech, is ‘forced labor or worker,’ which refers not to nonhuman
androids but simply to servitude” (2). Marques clearly identifies the need for a post-colonial
critique of current trends in AI innovation, as well as the overall culture of the technocratic elite.
By problematizing the myopia of a singular focus on the instrumental or anthropological
potential of technology, perhaps we can catch a glimpse of the essence of pre-modern technology
(i.e. prior to enframing). We have come to the point of automating away human labor [to AI, or,
to those deemed "subhuman"’], as we have increasingly become “nothing but the orderer of the
standing-reserve” (BW 323). In step, according to Heidegger, “[man] comes to the very brink of
a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standingreserve” (BW 323). With the whole of humanity thus converted into standing-reserve, it is those
with the most power (affluence) who make the decisions as to who or what is exploited.
In the case of AI, algorithms have come to dictate and run human activities. To return to
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the fivefold movement of enframing: a (1) challenging-forth is followed by a (2) positioning and
(3) ordering that transforms raw materials into (4) standing-reserve, thus resulting in a (5)
framework. Computational logic mirrors this movement, as an algorithm – defined as a “specific
set of instructions for carrying out a procedure or solving a problem” – is applied “to an input to
obtain an output” (Weisstein). Binary code is challenged-forth as input, positioned and ordered
during the computational process, and transformed into an output. Computers (of which AIs are a
type), run by algorithms, are valued for their certainty and speedy, and thus measured according
to accuracy and efficiency. The output or product (i.e. standing-reserve) of computers is in direct
competition with the productivity (labor) of humans. While capitalism may not be inherent to
enframing, it is an essential part of modern technology’s mode of being/revealing/unconcealment.
As Samantha bypassed the human realm (and thus the question of Being, at least as
Heidegger posits it), venturing into a revealing yet unknown, perhaps via the process of physis (a
self-positing), Ava and Ada both assimilated into a future society still dominated by humans,
where our relationship to technology seems to coalesce with contemporary futurist dreams.
While human activity can never directly counter the danger "that everything will present
itself only in the unconcealment of standing-reserve," artwork (defined broadly as anything
poetical) may return to the techné that "brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance"
(BW 339). Heidegger explains: "Because the essence of technology is nothing technological,
essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that
is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different
from it. Such a realm is art" (BW 340). In addition to the fine arts, an integral part of this realm
is poetry and storytelling. Discussing the role of speculative fiction (SF), the umbrella genre under
which Her, Ex Machina, & Alex + Ada all fall, Haraway writes: a "SF thread [that] is crucial to
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the practice of thinking, which must be thinking-with ... [is] storytelling. It matters what thoughts
think thoughts; it matters what stories tell stories" (SWTT 39). Moreover, "How other kinds of
beings see us matters. That other kinds of beings see us changes things" (Kohn 1). Perhaps within
the digital landscape of screens and visual media that bombard our senses and capture our attention,
film and graphic novels thus included, such a questioning (that requires pause and reflection)
concerning the essential unfolding of contemporary technology may commence.
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NOTES

1. Kimberlé Crenshaw's definition of intersectionality: “The view that women experience
oppression in varying configurations and in varying degrees of intensity. Cultural patterns of
oppression are not only interrelated, but are bound together and influenced by the intersectional
systems of society. Examples of this include race, gender, class, ability, and ethnicity.”
2. A term coined by feminist film theorist Barbara Creed (1993) to denote “what it is about
woman that is shocking, terrifying, horrific, abject” (1).

“The phrase ‘monstrous-feminine

emphasizes the importance of gender in the construction of her monstrosity,” as the “reasons why
the monstrous-feminine horrifies her audience are quite different from the reasons why the male
monster horrifies his audience” (Creed 3).
3. In Manuel DeLanda’s essay, “The Machinic Phylum” (TechnoMorphica, 1997), he
writes: “Deleuze and Guattari, who call attractors and bifurcations "singularities" (and the
emergent, holistic properties these stable states give rise to, "traits of expression") have suggested
that the history of technology may one day be rewritten as the history of artisans and metallurgists
following the singularities in the machinic phylum, selecting a few of these "virtual machines" to
actualize, creating new phyla, new lineages of technological objects.”
4. Luna, Vaughn make frequent use of bold typeface for emphasis throughout Alex + Ada.
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Figure A (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure B (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure C (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure D (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure E (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure F (Jonze, Her)

90

Figure G (Jonze, Her)
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Figure H (Luna & Vaughn, Alex + Ada)
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Figure I (Garland, Ex Machina)
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Figure J (Luna & Vaughn, Alex + Ada)
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